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ABSTRACT 
There is an urgent conversation happening among the world’s 
democracies about how to respond to the combined threat of online 
electioneering and foreign interference in domestic elections. Despite 
the shadow such activities cast over the 2016 presidential election in 
the United States, the United States has been largely absent from 
comparative discussions about how to tackle the problem. This is not 
just because of a recalcitrant president. The assumption that America’s 
“First Amendment Exceptionalism”—the idea that American freedom 
of expression law is simply too much of an outlier to warrant useful 
comparative consideration—is strong on both sides of the Atlantic. This 
is especially true in regard to the regulation of political campaigns.  
 
This Article challenges that assumption, and argues that America’s 
more libertarian approach to the legal regulation of political speech 
does not pose a barrier to fruitful comparative work in this area. It does 
so by comparing the law of the United States to that of the United 
Kingdom. Specifically, it organizes reform proposals being considered 
in the United States and United Kingdom into a common taxonomy, and 
sets out the legal standard governing each type of proposal in each 
country. Considering each country’s law through this organizational 
structure allows us to see that the legal differences between the United 
States and United Kingdom, while significant, rarely bar the types of 
changes being considered in either nation. Indeed, the two countries 
have much to learn from each other’s efforts in this area, and 
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lawmakers, regulators, and scholars should not hesitate to engage with 
the experiences of their transatlantic peers.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Article makes three distinct 
contributions. First, by clustering reform proposals into a taxonomy, it 
provides a structure for comparative work that will be useful not just in 
the United States and United Kingdom, but in all countries working to 
bring their election laws fully into the internet era. Second, by providing 
an in-depth yet accessible guide to the legal structures undergirding 
election law in the United States and United Kingdom, it provides a 
useful tool for scholars attempting to understand these systems. The 
U.S. system in particular is often quickly dismissed by other nations, but 
without a deeper understanding of how and why U.S. law has ended up 
as it has, those nations risk inadvertently following in its footsteps. 
Finally, it identifies several concrete areas where the United States and 
United Kingdom can benefit from each other’s expertise, thereby 
providing a roadmap for regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates 
in both countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 presidential election in the United States and referendum on 
European Union membership (Brexit) that same year in the United Kingdom 
were a wake-up call to those nations about the extent to which disinformation, 
propaganda, and “fake news” spread online can amplify extremism and 
undermine democratic elections. Regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates 
have responded by recommending a wide array of legal reforms, including 
changes to the rules governing political campaigns. In both the United States 
and the United Kingdom, this process has generated dozens of proposals to more 
effectively counter online and foreign efforts to influence voters and destabilize 
democratic institutions.  
Despite this, there has been little cross-country analysis comparing those 
proposals. This is not surprising. The assumption that America’s “First 
Amendment Exceptionalism”—the idea that American freedom of expression 
law is simply too much of an outlier to warrant comparative consideration—is 
widely held on both sides of the Atlantic.1 This is especially true in regard to the 
regulation of political campaigns, where the United States is most commonly 
held up in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) as a negative example to be 
avoided at all costs.2 In this Article, I challenge that assumption by 
demonstrating that the legal differences between the United States and the 
United Kingdom rarely bar the types of reform proposals being considered in 
either country, and that the two countries can in fact gain considerable insight 
from each other’s efforts to bring their election laws fully into the internet era.  
The Article has four parts. Part II illustrates the challenges faced in both 
nations by briefly recapping what we know now about online and foreign 
interference in the 2016 elections.3 Part III contextualizes those challenges by 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Free Speech Paternalism and Free Speech 
Exceptionalism: Pervasive Distrust of Government and the Contemporary First Amendment, 
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 659 (2015) (“[W]hen viewed from a global perspective, the American 
position of affording near-absolute protection to speech is strongly exceptionalist.”). 
 2 See R (Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [47]–[48], [2008] 1 AC 1312 (Baroness Hale of Richmond) (appeal 
taken from Eng.); COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE: THE 
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1998, Cm. 4047-I, ¶ 1.16, at 18 
(UK) [hereinafter NEILL REPORT]; Jacob Rowbottom, Animal Defenders International: 
Speech, Spending, and a Change of Direction in Strasbourg, 5 J. MEDIA L. 1, 5–6 (2013); 
ELECTORAL REFORM SOC’Y, REINING IN THE POLITICAL “WILD WEST”: CAMPAIGN RULES 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 35 (Michela Palese & Josiah Mortimer eds., Feb. 2019), 
https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/reining-in 
-the-political-wild-west-campaign-rules-for-the-21st-century/#sub-section-7 [https:// 
perma.cc/B3UA-82AN]. 
 3 Referendum campaigns like the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom are not 
“elections” (since no candidate is elected). Unless otherwise specified, this Article 
nonetheless uses the terms “elections” and “election laws” to refer to the full set of primary 
and secondary legislation, court decisions, regulations, and rules governing both candidate 
and referendum campaigns.  
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introducing readers to the foundational rules governing campaign finance and 
political party funding in the United States and United Kingdom. Part IV, which 
is the heart of the Article, considers the most significant reform proposals being 
discussed in each country and organizes them into a taxonomy. As Part IV 
demonstrates, once the reform proposals are analyzed through this structure, it 
becomes clear that the two countries have much to learn from each other, despite 
their different legal rules. The Article concludes by highlighting several areas 
where further comparative consideration would be the most valuable, and 
encouraging regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates in both countries to 
more fully engage with each other’s efforts in those areas.  
II. THE 2016 ELECTIONS 
The 2016 presidential election in the United States and the Brexit 
referendum in the United Kingdom have been extensively studied. In the United 
States, the Special Counsel to the U.S. Department of Justice, the intelligence 
community, and select committees of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives have all investigated the presidential election.4 In the United 
Kingdom, the Information Commissioner’s Office, the Election Commission, 
the Digital, Sports, Media and Culture Committee, and the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life have examined the Brexit referendum, which also was 
the subject of investigations by the Cabinet Office and the National Crime 
Agency.5 
                                                                                                                     
 4 See, e.g., ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 (Mar. 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBQ8-DU5W] 
[hereinafter MUELLER REPORT] (redacted); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS i (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZA8-Q8VX]; 
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 3 (2019), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW3K-Q2NQ]; 
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS 1 (Comm. Print 
2018), https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SSCI%20ICA%20ASSESSMENT 
_FINALJULY3.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ3A-WDC3] (redacted); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE 1–2 (July 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download [https://perma.cc/J96P-X9T5].  
 5 CABINET OFFICE, PROTECTING THE DEBATE: INTIMIDATION, INFLUENCE AND 
INFORMATION GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 10, 20–21 (May 2019), https://assets.publishing 
.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/799873/Pr
otecting-the-Debate-Government-Response-2019.05.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2L9-
W5GV] [hereinafter PROTECTING THE DEBATE]; DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT 
COMM., DISINFORMATION AND “FAKE NEWS”: FINAL REPORT, 2017–2019, HC 1791, ¶¶ 148–
92 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/  
1791.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ADC-N6SY] [hereinafter DCMS REPORT]; INFO. COMM’R’S 
OFFICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE OF DATA ANALYTICS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: A 
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The two countries have focused their efforts somewhat differently. The 
United States has focused mainly on foreign interference, while the United 
Kingdom has looked more at data breaches, micro-targeted advertising, and 
campaign funding improprieties.6 But their work reveals the same thing: 
changes in how paid and unpaid communications are purchased, targeted, and 
shared online have created an unprecedented ability for outside actors to 
influence domestic politics in ways our election rules did not fully anticipate 
and have not effectively responded to.7  
In the United States, the report released in May 2019 by Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller (the Mueller Report) details how Russian-affiliated actors 
engaged in an extensive online campaign to influence the 2016 presidential 
election.8 In the months before the election, this campaign was supported by a 
budget of more than $1,250,000 per month and included stealing online 
identities and information, training foreign actors to create and disseminate 
inflammatory messages about socially divisive issues, and using interconnected 
                                                                                                                     
REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 7 (Nov. 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/22 
60271/investigation-into-the-use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-2018 
1105.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3NG-YERQ]; THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, THE 2016 EU 
REFERENDUM: REPORT ON THE JUNE 2016 REFERENDUM ON THE UK’S MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 5 (Sept. 2016), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/ 
default/files/pdf_file/2016-EU-referendum-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU8M-N63V] 
[hereinafter 2016 EU REFERENDUM]; Investigation into Payments Made to Better for the 
Country and Leave.EU, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ 
who-we-are-and-what-we-do/our-enforcement-work/investigations/investigation-pay 
ments-made-better-country-and-leaveeu [https://perma.cc/4DUE-NYJP] (last updated 
Oct. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Investigation into Payments]; Public Statement on NCA 
Investigation into Suspected EU Referendum Offenses, NAT’L CRIME AGENCY (Sept. 24, 
2019), https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/public-statement-on-nca-investigation-
into-suspected-eu-referendum-offences [https://perma.cc/C6NF-UJHB] (discussing the 
findings of the NCA’s investigation).  
 6 Compare MUELLER REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–3, with INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, 
supra note 5, at 7. 
 7 For a discussion of the 2016 presidential election and subsequent reform proposals 
in the United States, see generally STANFORD CYBER POLICY CTR., SECURING AMERICAN 
ELECTIONS: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
2020 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BEYOND (Michael McFaul ed., 2019); DCMS 
REPORT, supra note 5, ¶¶ 240–49 (discussing findings related to Kremlin-aligned media 
messaging in the United Kingdom). 
 8 According to an indictment filed February 16, 2018 by Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller, Russian intelligence worked through a Russian corporation—the Internet Research 
Agency (IRA)—to engage in online “information warfare against the United States.” 
Indictment ¶ (10)(c), United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 18-cr-00032-DLF 
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). The IRA employed hundreds of people to pose as Americans and 
comment on social media about U.S. politics. Id. ¶¶ (10)(a), 32–34. The IRA also engaged 
in data analytics to target Americans with political messages, and to create and spread 
“distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general” in the lead-up to the 
2016 presidential election. Id. ¶ (10)(e). The foreign origin of these activities was masked, 
both online and in the underlying financial transactions. Id. ¶ 58.  
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and often automated networks to spread those messages to targeted audiences 
across social media platforms.9 There appears to have been less overt 
interference in the United Kingdom, but investigations since the Brexit vote 
have disclosed the prevalence and coordinated distribution of Kremlin-aligned 
media messaging online,10 a “Brexit Botnet” active during the referendum 
campaign,11 misleading and inflammatory online advertising campaigns 
targeted to select audiences,12 and concerns that existing law enabled foreign 
sources to fund certain online campaign activities.13  
These events revealed just how ill-equipped existing campaign laws are to 
deal with this type of activity. Political advertising has been migrating online 
for decades, but the regulatory systems in both the United States and United 
Kingdom lag well behind.14 The problems in each country are similar. Online 
election communications are subject to few or no transparency requirements, 
existing reporting rules make it difficult to trace online ads to their underlying 
funding source, expenditure thresholds triggering regulation do not capture 
either the low cost of online advertising or the organic way information travels 
online, microtargeted online advertising diminishes the effectiveness of both 
regulations and “counter-speech” responses, and rules intended to limit foreign 
influence in domestic elections are riddled with gaps and unresolved definitional 
issues. 
Understanding how the United States and United Kingdom can learn from 
each other’s efforts to fix these problems requires first understanding the basic 
rules currently in place in each country. The following Part provides this, by 
explaining the foundations of the U.S. and U.K. campaign finance and political 
party funding laws. 
III. FOUNDATIONS 
A. Campaign Finance Law in the United States 
The backbone of the United States campaign finance system is the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA), as amended in 1974 in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal.15 Congress intended the new law to govern virtually all 
                                                                                                                     
 9 Id. ¶¶ 11(b), 32–41. 
 10 DCMS REPORT, supra note 5, ¶¶ 240–49. 
 11 Marco T. Bastos & Dan Mercea, The Brexit Botnet and User-Generated 
Hyperpartisan News, 37 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 38, 38 (2019). 
 12 DCMS REPORT, supra note 5, ¶¶ 218–21. 
 13 Id. ¶¶ 31–40. 
 14 See id. ¶¶ 11–52. 
 15 Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (2012 & Supp. IV 
2017); see ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGN FINANCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 10 
(2016). Watergate revealed loopholes in campaign finance rules that had allowed candidate 
campaign committees to collect large and often undisclosed donations, some of which came 
from foreign sources and many of which were routed through intermediaries to mask their 
true origins. See id. at 10–14. 
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aspects of how campaigns for federal office are regulated.16 It imposed 
contribution and expenditure limits on candidates, political parties, and third-
party campaigners,17 bolstered regulatory reporting requirements, tightened 
rules against the solicitation and use of foreign funds, and created a federal 
regulatory body—the Federal Elections Commission (FEC)—to administer the 
new rules.18 The law was immediately challenged in court.19 The main argument 
made by the challengers was that virtually all the new rules infringed on political 
speech protected by the First Amendment.20 
The resulting Supreme Court decision, Buckley v. Valeo, remains the 
constitutional cornerstone of campaign finance regulation in the United States. 
To understand Buckley, it is useful to keep in mind three things: (1) the 
difference between contributions (money given to others to spend) and 
expenditures (money an individual or group spends itself); (2) the difference 
between candidates and political parties on the one hand, and third-party 
campaigners (groups other than candidates or political parties) on the other; and 
(3) the difference between what came to be known as “express advocacy” 
(which directly calls for the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office) 
and “issue advocacy” (which does not).21 The Buckley Court treated each of 
these differences as important, and the constitutionality of a given rule today 
often hinges on how these categories are defined. 
Buckley is a complex opinion. The Court first addressed the difference 
between contributions and expenditures.22 It viewed contribution limits as only 
indirectly restricting speech.23 While such limits restrict the amount of money a 
                                                                                                                     
 16 In the United States, Congress has full authority to legislate in relation to elections 
for federal offices and limited authority to regulate in relation to elections for state offices. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-470, THE 
SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 3–11 (2001), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/230112.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7G2-ADJ3]. This Article 
addresses only federal law, but decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the First 
Amendment limit both federal and state laws and regulations. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 
see, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  
 17 Federal Election Campaign Act § 30116. The term “third-party campaigners” is used 
in both the United States and the United Kingdom to refer to groups (such as interest or 
pressure groups) other than political parties and candidates. See generally Andrew C. Geddis, 
Confronting the “Problem” of Third Party Expenditures in United Kingdom Election Law, 
27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 103, 107 (2001) (examining how U.K. legislation regulates “third 
party” expenditures on public messages). 
 18 Federal Election Campaign Act §§ 30104, 30106, 30121.  
 19 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976). 
 20 Id. at 11. See generally Brief of the Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
(Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 441595, at *29. 
 21 Federal Election Campaign Act §§ 30101(2), (8)–(9), (16)–(17); see Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 42–44; Frank Askin, Issue Advocacy, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www 
.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/996/issue-advocacy [https://perma.cc/KS27-25XF] 
(defining “issue advocacy”). 
 22 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19–23. 
 23 Id. at 20–21. 
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donor can give to political parties, candidates, and third-party groups, they do 
not directly restrict the donor’s speech itself.24 As such, contribution limits need 
not be subject to the most robust judicial scrutiny and should be upheld as long 
as they are “closely drawn” to achieve a “sufficiently important interest.”25 The 
Court accepted that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was 
such an interest, and that contribution limits were sufficiently related to that 
interest.26 So the contribution limits imposed by FECA survived this relatively 
relaxed level of review.27  
The Court viewed expenditure limits differently. Unlike contributions 
limits, the Buckley Court saw expenditure limits as directly limiting the ability 
of a speaker to communicate his or her own ideas.28 Limits on expenditures, 
therefore, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and any regulation of them needs 
to be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling interest.29 The expenditure limits 
in FECA failed this test.30 The government had defended the law’s 
comprehensive expenditure limits as necessary to promote political equality and 
to reduce the overall amount of money spent in political campaigns.31 The Court 
found both of these reasons constitutionally insufficient.32 Limiting the speech 
of some in order to enhance that of others was “wholly foreign” to the First 
Amendment, the Court said, and it was not up to Congress to determine whether 
the amount of money spent on political speech was wasteful or excessive.33 The 
Court also held that the anti-corruption interest, while compelling, could not 
justify expenditure limits: as long as political parties and candidates were 
spending money they had raised in compliance with the contribution limits, 
expenditure limits served no additional anti-corruption purpose.34 Third-party 
spending likewise posed no risk of quid pro quo corruption, the Court found, as 
long as done independently of candidates and parties.35 All of FECA’s 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Id. at 21. 
 25 Id. at 25.  
 26 Id. at 27–29. 
 27 Id. at 143–44. Buckley itself was somewhat opaque about the exact standard of review 
it was applying to contributions limits, which has been clarified by subsequent decisions. See 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000) (“Precision about the relative 
rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per 
curiam opinion.”). 
 28 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19–21. 
 29 See id. at 44–45. The “exacting” or strict scrutiny applied by the Court in Buckley 
requires the regulation to be “narrowly tailored” to advance a “compelling” interest. See First 
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (internal citations omitted); NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
 30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58–59. 
 31 Id. at 48–49, 57. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. For a comparative treatment of the concept of equality in U.S. campaign finance 
law, see generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign 
Finance Law: A Trans-Border Comparison, 5 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381 (2011). 
 34 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–48, 53, 55. 
 35 See id. at 45. 
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expenditure limits therefore were deemed unconstitutional infringements on 
political speech and struck down.36  
The Court did uphold FECA’s transparency rules.37 The law included two 
types of transparency requirements. Disclosure rules requiring candidates, 
political parties, and some groups to publicly disclose most of their 
contributions and expenditures through mandatory reporting to the FEC,38 and 
disclaimer rules (called “imprint” rules in the United Kingdom) requiring 
certain spenders to identify on the face of a communication who had authorized 
and paid for it.39 These transparency regulations, the Buckley Court held, only 
indirectly affected speech.40 Like contribution limits, they therefore would be 
subject to less rigorous judicial scrutiny and were sufficiently supported by both 
the interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof, and the interest 
in avoiding circumvention of the contribution limits the Court had just upheld.41  
The Court’s decision upholding disclosure and disclaimer requirements 
included an important caveat, however, involving the second and third 
distinctions set out above: the difference between candidates and political 
parties, and third-party campaigners; and the difference between express and 
issue advocacy. Under FECA, candidates and political parties are by definition 
entities whose primary purpose is to influence federal elections.42 The Buckley 
Court therefore saw no difficultly in requiring them to regularly report their 
contributions and expenditures to the FEC. But third-party campaigners engage 
in many different types of activities, only some of which will influence federal 
elections.43 The Court therefore insisted that any scheme regulating the 
independent activity of third-party groups distinguish between “express 
advocacy” to influence federal elections and “issue advocacy” which the Court 
saw as the type of everyday advocacy around public policy issues that citizens 
should be able to engage in without becoming entangled in a complex regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
 36 Id. at 58–59. 
 37 Id. at 84. 
 38 Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30104 (Supp. IV 2017). 
 39 See Press Release, Cabinet Office & Kevin Foster MP, Government Safeguards UK 
Elections (May 5, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-safeguards-uk-
elections [https://perma.cc/24YH-NYYW] (“Candidates, political parties and non-party 
campaigners will also be required to brand or ‘imprint’ their digital election materials, so the 
public is clear who is targeting them.”); Federal Election Campaign Act § 30120(a). For a 
discussion of disclosure and disclaimer rules, see R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
IF10758, ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING: DISCLAIMERS AND POLICY ISSUES (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10758.pdf [https://perma.cc/W66X-M2UB]. The term 
“disclaimer” appears to have been coined because of the requirement imposed by some of 
these rules that the communication clearly state that it is has not been endorsed by a 
candidate. See id. 
 40 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65. 
 41 Id. at 66–68.  
 42 See Federal Election Campaign Act §§ 30101(2), (16). 
 43 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68. 
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regime.44 Moreover, in order to avoid “chilling” pure issue advocacy, the 
distinction between these two types of speech had to be clearly delineated.45  
The Court acknowledged that creating a bright-line test of this sort would 
be challenging, but went ahead and did so anyway. In a footnote, it limited the 
relevant provisions of the law to communications including what came to be 
known as the “magic words.”46 Under this test, only communications including 
words such as “vote for,” “vote against,” “defeat,” or “reject” could be 
regulated.47 Consequently, under Buckley, third-party advocacy meeting the 
magic words test was subject to disclaimer and disclosure rules, but that which 
did not was not.48 As discussed below, subsequent legislation and court 
decisions have tweaked this dividing line, but its fundamental importance 
continues to drive U.S. law. 
The practical effect of Buckley was to create a campaign finance regulatory 
system that no one intentionally designed and very few people actually like.49 
A law calibrated to restrict both the ability to raise money (through contribution 
limits) and the need for it (through expenditure limits) became a system in which 
candidates have an escalating need for money but a tightly restricted ability to 
access it. Later decisions further held that while all money raised by candidates 
and political parties was subject to contribution limits, third-party “expenditure-
only” groups eschewing express advocacy could raise money in unlimited and 
often undisclosed amounts.50 This had the predictable effect of channeling 
money away from candidates and political parties, and toward less publicly 
accountable third-party groups.51 It doing so, it also created a system in which 
much election-related activity operates outside the federal regulatory scheme. 
                                                                                                                     
 44 See id. at 80. 
 45 Id. at 39–51.  
 46 Id. at 44 n.52; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 439–
40 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126–
27 (2003). 
 47 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
 48 See, e.g., Citizens United, 58 U.S. at 439–40 (Stevens, J., concurring); McConnell, 
540 U.S. at 126. 
 49 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Campaign Finance Regulation in North America: An 
Institutional Perspective, 17 ELECTION L.J. 188, 190–94 (2018); see also Richard L. Hasen, 
Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 35–41 (2004).  
 50 “Expenditure-only” groups are third-party campaign groups that spend money but do 
not make contributions to candidates, political parties, or other groups that do make such 
donations. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 694–96 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).  
 51 In the 2016 U.S. election cycle, outside groups spent nearly $1.4 billon, surpassing 
the spending of both major parties (whose combined spending totaled only $290 million). 
Young Mie Kim et al., The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets Behind Divisive Issue 
Campaigns on Facebook, 35 POL. COMM. 515, 518 (2018). 
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B. Political Party Funding and Campaign Finance Law in the United 
Kingdom 
Campaign finance regulation in the United Kingdom is in some ways the 
diametric opposite of that in the United States. Rather than control the 
availability of funds through limits on contributions to candidates and political 
parties, the U.K. system controls the need for them by restricting expenditures 
through spending limits and a ban on expensive broadcast advertising. It also 
tightly restricts third-party spending and imposes similar transparency rules on 
third-party campaigners as it does on candidates and political parties. This is 
very different than the United States system, which strictly limits contributions 
to candidates, political parties, and some third-party groups; restricts candidate 
and political party financing more tightly than that of third-party campaigners; 
and is constitutionally prohibited from limiting expenditures at all.  
Three pieces of primary legislation structure the U.K. system. The 
Representation of the People Act 1983 (RPA) governs constituency-level 
spending; the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) 
governs national spending; and the Communications Act 2003 regulates 
political communications on broadcast television and radio.52 Most of the 
restrictions imposed under these statutes apply only during the “regulated 
period,” which is set by the U.K. Electoral Commission (EC) and usually covers 
a year prior to a general election or four months prior to a referendum or other 
election.53  
The RPA is the oldest of these laws, and many of its provisions have been 
in place in some form for decades. It focuses on the spending that happens for 
or against individual candidates within constituency districts.54 The law sets a 
                                                                                                                     
 52 See Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2 §§ 71A, 73 (UK), http://www 
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/contents [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE]; Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2000/41/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC]; Communications Act 2003, c. 
21 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents [https://perma.cc/2RED-
WWYZ]. 
 53 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF PARTY CAMPAIGN SPENDING 5 (2016), 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/to-campaign-spend 
-rp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KSN-W9GD] [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF PARTY CAMPAIGN 
SPENDING]. Constituency spending is, generally speaking, spending for or against a 
particular candidate in a particular district. See id. at 4. National level spending is spending 
for or against a political party or national referendum. See id. The regulated period for a 
general election can apply retroactively after an election is called. Non-Party Campaigners: 
Where to Start, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/non-party-
campaigners-where-start/does-your-campaign-activity-meet-purpose-test/purpose-test-
regulated-period-early-uk-parliamentary-general-election [https://perma.cc/YNY6-2FN3] 
(last updated Sept. 23, 2019).  
 54 See Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2, §§ 71A–90D (UK), http://www 
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/contents [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE]. Members 
of the Westminster Parliament (the legislative body of the United Kingdom) are elected by 
a first-past-the-post system in single member constituency districts. Id. c. 2, sch. 1. Separate 
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base level of permitted spending that is the same for all candidates in all districts, 
with additional spending permitted on a per-elector basis, allowing candidates 
in more heavily populated districts to spend more.55 It also tightly restricts third-
party spending for or against specific constituency-level candidates.56  
When the RPA was enacted, its focus on constituency-level spending made 
sense. Historically, the national expenditures of the two main political parties 
were small compared to the spending done by candidates in individual 
districts.57 But by the 1990s, political parties had grown in importance and 
spending had shifted away from constituency districts and to the national, party-
driven campaigns. Advocates of reform began arguing that the RPA’s focus 
solely on constituency-level spending did not adequately address the reality of 
how U.K. campaigns were funded.58 There also was concern about the influence 
on elected officials of large and undisclosed donations, and what was 
increasingly seen as excessive spending on campaigns.59 PPERA responded to 
those concerns.  
PPERA grew out of the Standing Committee on Standards in Public Life 
(the Neill Committee), which Parliament had tasked with recommending 
changes to the United Kingdom’s campaign finance laws.60 The Neill 
Committee made more than 100 recommendations, most of which were adopted 
by Parliament in PPERA.61 Despite the hopes of some reform advocates, these 
changes did not include imposing caps on contributions. Political contributions 
in the United Kingdom remain uncapped, and the major parties are funded by 
membership dues plus a relatively small number of very large donations.62 
                                                                                                                     
elections are held to elect the U.K. members of the European Parliament, and the members 
of the national parliaments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. See Guide to May 2016 
Elections in Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35813119 [https://perma.cc/KDW7-X4QY].  
 55 Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2, § 76(2) (UK), http://www.legislation 
.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/contents [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE]. Constituency districts 
in the United Kingdom vary in population size. See FEARGAL MCGUINNESS, HOUSE OF 
COMMONS LIBRARY, SIZES OF CONSTITUENCY ELECTORATES 7–22 (2011).  
 56 Jacob Eisler, Formalism and Realism in Campaign Finance Law, 78 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
257, 257–58 (2019).  
 57 NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, ¶ 10.16, at 114. 
 58 See Geddis, supra note 17, at 110–15. 
 59 NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, ¶10.2, at 110.  
 60 Terms of Reference, COMMITTEE STANDARDS PUB. LIFE, https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/organisations/the-committee-on-standards-in-public-life/about/terms-of-
reference [https://perma.cc/M2LK-C2KN]; see also 12 Nov. 1997, Parl Deb HC (1997) 
col. 899 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo971112/ 
debtext/71112-20.htm#71112-20_sbhd0 [https://perma.cc/2S5M-F69F]. 
 61 NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1–100, at 4–14 (outlining the recommendations 
offered by the committee). 
 62 The Committee tried again in 2011 after all three main British political parties made 
a commitment in principle to support contribution caps, but was unable to come up with a 
proposal all parties would agree to. COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, POLITICAL PARTY 
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PPERA did, however, require for the first time that contributions exceeding 
£5000 (later raised to £750063) be publicly disclosed.64  
PPERA also imposed nationwide expenditure limits on political parties and 
third-party campaigners (the RPA continues to govern the expenditure limits 
imposed on individual candidates and third-party constituency-level 
spending).65 Different limits apply to different spenders in different elections. 
Calculating the applicable limit turns on things like when in the Parliamentary 
cycle the spending occurs, how many constituency districts are being contested, 
and in which part of the United Kingdom the spending takes place.66 Political 
parties have higher limits than third-party campaigners, and also have separate 
limits for general party advocacy versus candidate-specific advocacy.67 The 
applicable limits for referendums (like the Brexit vote) are set by the EC.68 As 
in the United States, to avoid circumvention of these limits, coordinated 
spending is treated differently. Spending done in coordination with a political 
party (or “lead campaign group” in a referendum) is counted toward the 
spending cap of the party or lead group.69 If other registered campaigners 
coordinate with each other, their spending is considered that of one group, and 
their combined total must stay within the applicable limit as such.70  
The third significant statute in the U.K. regulatory scheme is the 
Communications Act 2003. The 2003 law updated and continued the long-
standing ban in the United Kingdom prohibiting political advertising on 
                                                                                                                     
FINANCE: ENDING THE BIG DONOR CULTURE, 2011, Cm. 8208, at 8–9 (UK) [hereinafter 
POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE].  
 63 STUART WILKS-HEEG & STEPHEN CRONE, FUNDING POLITICAL PARTIES IN GREAT 
BRITAIN: A PATHWAY TO REFORM 13 (2010). 
 64 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 62 (UK), http://www 
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC]. 
 65 Id. c. 41, §§ 79, 94, schs. 9, 10. 
 66 Id. These limits were tied to the proportion of the vote the party received at the most 
recent general election, which was the 2015 general Westminster Parliament election. 
 67 For example, in 2011 in a general election for the Westminster Parliament in which 
all constituency districts were being contested, the spending cap on each of the political 
parties was £19.5 million. POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE, supra note 62, at 30. The national 
spending cap for registered third parties (interest groups intending to spend more than 
£10,000 to attempt to influence an election) was just under £800,000 in England, and the 
third-party limit for candidate-specific spending in the constituency districts was £500. Id. at 
31–32. 
 68 For referendum campaigns, the EC uses a statutorily defined process to identify a 
“lead campaign group” for each side of the debate. See THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, THE 
DESIGNATION PROCESS 4 (Mar. 2016), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/ 
default/files/pdf_file/Designation-process-for-the-EU-referendum.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/E73H-TRXV] [hereinafter DESIGNATION PROCESS]. The lead campaign group has a 
significantly higher spending limit than other registered groups. For Brexit, the lead 
campaigns had a limit of £7 million while the limit for other registered campaign groups was 
£700,000. 2016 EU REFERENDUM, supra note 5, at 91. 
 69 See DESIGNATION PROCESS, supra note 68, at 6. 
 70 See id. 
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broadcast media.71 Unlike the RPA and PPERA, this restriction is in effect at 
all times, not just during the regulated election period. Under the Act, 
recognized political parties contesting seats in a requisite number of 
constituency districts are given free broadcast time during the lead up to an 
election, but no other political ads can be legally broadcast on public or private 
television or radio at any time.72 The ban is far-reaching, and applies not only 
to political party ads, but also to third-party ads “directed towards a political 
end.”73  
The combined effect of RPA, PPERA, and the Communications Act 2003 
is a regulatory system very different from that in the United States. Those 
differences are significant—the Communications Act 2003, for example, would 
be plainly unconstitutional under United States law. As shown below, however, 
the reform proposals being considered in each nation only rarely implicate these 
differences, allowing ample room for constructive comparative work.  
IV. TAXONOMY OF REFORM PROPOSALS 
Regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates in the United States and 
United Kingdom have generated numerous proposals to more effectively 
regulate online campaigning and foreign interference in domestic elections. 
Some of these proposals—such as tightening data privacy rules and imposing 
antitrust restraints on social media companies—do not directly engage 
campaign laws and are not discussed here. Others, however, touch on 
controversies central to those laws, such as how to define campaign-related 
speech, how to balance personal privacy with public accountability, and how to 
ensure fair elections without infringing on the freedom of expression essential 
to a functioning democracy.  
This Part addresses those proposals. In doing so, it organizes them into a 
common taxonomy, and examines the legal rules governing each class of 
proposal in each nation. Grouping the proposals into this organizational scheme 
brings a systemic coherence to comparative work in this area by contextualizing 
similar proposals within the specific legal rules under which they will be 
evaluated. This enables more of an “apples-to-apples” evaluation of the legal 
challenges each type of reform will face in each nation, allowing us to see more 
clearly which proposals are worthy of additional comparative study, and which 
are not.  
The taxonomy classifies reform proposals according to their underlying 
goals. There are four principle goals: better educating the public about digital 
literacy (public education); enhancing the transparency of online campaigning 
(transparency); reducing the influence of foreign interests over voters’ choices 
                                                                                                                     
 71 Communications Act 2003, c. 21, § 321 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2003/21/contents [https://perma.cc/2RED-WWYZ].  
 72 Id. §§ 319, 321, 333.  
 73 Id. § 321(2)(a)–(c).  
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(source exclusions); and excluding deceptive or otherwise harmful content from 
online distribution (content exclusions). Not all reform proposals, of course, fit 
neatly into this taxonomy, nor does the analysis that follows discuss every 
proposal made within each category; the taxonomy is exemplary, not 
comprehensive. But organizing the most common proposals this way efficiently 
facilitates comparative consideration.  
As shown below, these four types of reform proposals can be visualized as 
a pyramid. The reforms at the base of the pyramid (public education) face few 
system-specific legal challenges and therefore are the most comparable across 
systems; reforms at the peak (content exclusions) face the most such challenges, 
and therefore offer fewer opportunities for productive comparative analysis 
(although even here there are areas in which the two nations can learn from each 
other’s experiences).  
 
 
 
Public education proposals, at the base of the pyramid, do not directly 
involve campaign laws but are included because their goal is to make voters 
more critical consumers of political messages they see online. In the United 
States, these proposals include federal efforts such as the expansion of the State 
Department’s counterterrorism mission to include combating disinformation, 
and efforts such as those in California, Massachusetts, and Washington to teach 
digital media literacy in schools.74 In the United Kingdom, this category 
includes things like proposals to use a social media tax to fund online literacy 
                                                                                                                     
 74 Alex Stamos et al., Combatting State-Sponsored Disinformation Campaigns from 
State-Aligned Actors, in STANFORD CYBER POLICY CTR., supra note 7, at 44 (internal 
citations omitted). 
420 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:3 
programs, and efforts to promote awareness of the standards of professional 
journalism.75 Public education proposals like these are unlikely to face 
significant legal challenges in either country and are only briefly discussed 
below. 
Transparency proposals aim to help voters make more informed choices by 
ensuring they understand who is promoting or paying for the political messages 
they see. Transparency proposals are plentiful in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and include recommendations to require disclaimers 
(imprints) on online ads, require more detailed reporting of online expenditures, 
and change the type and nature of online spending disclosed to regulatory 
bodies.76 The laws governing transparency rules in the United States and United 
Kingdom are different, and these differences mean reforms in this category will 
face distinct legal challenges in each nation. Examining these proposals through 
the structure provided by the taxonomy allows us to see that these legal 
differences are not as relevant to the reforms being proposed as is frequently 
assumed. This category therefore provides extensive opportunity for genuinely 
valuable comparative consideration. 
Source exclusions regulate political communications based on who is 
speaking, promoting, or paying for the communication. The goal of reform 
proposals in this class is to limit the influence of foreign interests on domestic 
elections by precluding foreign funding of election-related communications. 
Analyzing each nation’s law through the taxonomy reveals that source 
exclusions will face significantly different legal challenges in the United States 
and United Kingdom, but that there is sufficient common ground even here to 
make comparative study useful. 
Content exclusions are designed to exclude or reduce harmful 
communications online. What is considered “harmful” varies in these proposals, 
and ranges from things already regulated if done offline (such as defamation, 
harassment, fraud, or abuse) to more controversial efforts to limit the online 
spread of propaganda, disinformation, and other content considered detrimental 
to democratic discourse. Context exclusions, at the apex of the pyramid, will 
face the most system-specific legal barriers, many of which are likely to be 
insurmountable in the United States. 
The remainder of this Part will discuss in detail the current rules governing 
each of these categories in the United States and United Kingdom, and the legal 
                                                                                                                     
 75 Damian Tambini, Three Ways the Government Can Supercharge Media Literacy 
Policy in the UK, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ 
medialse/2019/01/30/3-ways-the-government-can-supercharge-media-literacy-policy 
-in-the-uk [https://perma.cc/7WZG-72L2]. 
 76 See, e.g., Advertising and Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www 
.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/advertising/ [https:// 
perma.cc/76WL-ESSZ] (outlining online disclosure); Campaign Finance: United 
Kingdom, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/uk.php 
[https://perma.cc/8GHG-FL6M] (last updated July 1, 2015) (outlining U.K. online 
expenditure requirements). 
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challenges reforms in each category of proposal are likely to face in each 
country. In doing so, it also will identify the specific areas where further 
comparative study will be most beneficial.  
A. Public Education 
Rather than directly regulate campaign speech, public education proposals 
seek to make voters more critical consumers of the political messages they see. 
This type of public education effort is unlikely to encounter significant legal 
barriers in either the United States or the United Kingdom. It nonetheless is 
included here because of its fundamental importance in combatting online and 
foreign election interference. Effective regulation of election-related speech is 
devilishly difficult, and will be so even if campaign laws are fully updated and 
regulators fully engaged. Increasing awareness of the problem through public 
education efforts is therefore critical.  
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have taken small steps in 
this area. In the United States, the mission of the State Department’s Global 
Engagement Center has been expanded to include countering foreign 
disinformation more broadly.77 The U.S. Intelligence Community also has made 
efforts to increase public awareness of the problem. The former Director of 
National Intelligence,78 the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,79 
the former Homeland Security Secretary,80 and the former Special Counsel to 
the U.S. Attorney General all have made public statements warning Americans 
of ongoing efforts by foreign actors to use social media platforms to inflame 
political tensions and influence U.S. elections.81 In the United Kingdom, former 
                                                                                                                     
 77 Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act, S. 3274, 114th Cong. 
(2016). This Act was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017. Compare id., with National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 
Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1287, 130 Stat. 2000, 2546–48 (2016) (directing the establishment 
of a Global Engagement Center to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state 
and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts”).  
 78 See Martin Matishak, Intelligence Heads Warn of More Aggressive Election 
Meddling in 2020, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/29/ 
dan-coats-2020-election-foreign-interference-1126077 [https://perma.cc/GY2K-RX4J].  
 79 Julian E. Barnes & Adam Goldman, F.B.I. Warns of Russian Interference in 2020 
Race and Boosts Counterintelligence Operations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/us/politics/fbi-russian-election-interference.html [https://perma 
.cc/TZB4-7LPA].  
 80 Eric Schmitt et al., In Push for 2020 Election Security, Top Official Was Warned: 
Don’t Tell Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/ 
us/politics/russia-2020-election-trump.html [https://perma.cc/BZ6S-78KX].  
 81 Full Transcript of Mueller’s Statement on Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 
29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/politics/mueller-transcript.html [https 
://perma.cc/SJS6-7C4E].  
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Prime Minister Theresa May has done so as well.82 Public education efforts also 
have been endorsed by most of the commissions and committees examining the 
issue in the United Kingdom, including the Electoral Commission,83 the 
Information Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life,84 and the 
House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee.85  
While these efforts have varying degrees of political support, they raise few 
serious legal issues in either the United States or the United Kingdom. Within 
broad limits, governments in both countries are free to engage in public 
information campaigns. In the United Kingdom, this type of effort would 
encounter no discernable legal challenges.86 In the United States, public 
information campaigns are governed by the “government speech” doctrine. The 
core tenet of this doctrine is that when the government itself is speaking, it is 
allowed to advocate for its preferred position. So, for example, the government 
can fund an anti-smoking campaign without also having to fund pro-smoking 
messages. The doctrine is underdeveloped in several ways,87 but as long as it is 
clear the government is the entity speaking, a public information campaign 
designed to increase digital literacy among voters would be unlikely to 
encounter significant legal challenge even in the United States. The remainder 
of this Article therefore will focus on the other three classes in the taxonomy: 
transparency, source exclusions, and content exclusions.  
B. Transparency 
Transparency is the largest and most diverse class in the taxonomy. When 
considering transparency proposals and the rules governing them, it is helpful 
to remember the distinction mentioned above between disclosure and disclaimer 
(imprint) rules. Disclosure rules require candidates, political parties, and some 
                                                                                                                     
 82 Prime Minister Theresa May, Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-to-the-lord-mayors-banquet-2017 
[https://perma.cc/S95H-WZ9P]. 
 83 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING: INCREASING TRANSPARENCY FOR 
VOTERS ¶¶ 32–34 (2018), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/  
pdf_file/Digital-campaigning-improving-transparency-for-voters.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
W3FP-QFMU] [hereinafter DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING]. 
 84 COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, INTIMIDATION IN PUBLIC LIFE 18 (Dec. 2017), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/666927/6.3637_CO_v6_061217_Web3.1__2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ79-MCYP]. 
 85 The DCSM Report identifies digital literacy as a “fourth pillar” of education, along 
with reading, writing, and math. DCSM REPORT, supra note 5, at 87. 
 86 DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING, supra note 83, ¶¶ 104–25, at 20–23. There are limits in the 
United Kingdom on governmental spending to promote particular outcomes in referendums. 
See generally 2016 EU REFERENDUM, supra note 5, at 90.  
 87 There are unresolved questions about how to distinguish the government’s own 
speech from governmental funding for the speech of others, and whether it is legally relevant 
that the recipients of the message understand they are hearing a government-provided 
communication. There also are tangentially related prohibitions and norms against using 
federal funds to distribute propaganda directed at U.S. citizens. 
2020] FIRST AMENDMENT (UN)EXCEPTIONALISM 423 
groups to report their income and expenditures to a regulatory body. Disclaimer 
rules require certain communications to carry on their face information about 
who authorized or paid for the communication. Disclosure rules advance 
transparency by informing the public about who supports candidates for public 
office and who those candidates may be indebted to if elected; disclaimer rules 
advance transparency by informing the public about the source of the political 
messages they are seeing.88 The most prominent reform proposals in this class 
involve strengthening disclosure rules by requiring more detailed reporting 
about the financing of such communications, and expanding disclaimer rules to 
cover more online communications.  
The breadth and variety of online communications potentially covered by 
disclosure and disclaimer rules is what creates the legal challenges in this 
category. Any transparency rule, whether it be about disclaimers or disclosures, 
must define the communications it covers. This is challenging even when 
targeting traditional campaign communications, and becomes more so in the 
fluid world of online social media. Relatedly, lawmakers also must decide if 
online transparency rules should mirror offline rules, or if the differences 
between formats warrant distinct regulatory approaches. As shown below, while 
the United States and United Kingdom regulate disclosures and disclaimers 
quite differently, each country struggles with these same questions. 
1. Transparency in the United States 
The federal statutory law governing disclosure and disclaimer in the United 
States is found in two statutes: the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA, 
discussed above), and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, which 
amended FECA in 2002).89 FECA requires political parties, candidates, and 
certain third-party campaigners to register and file regular reports with the FEC. 
Political parties and candidates running for federal office must register with the 
FEC when they raise or spend over a threshold amount in connection with a 
federal election.90 Third-party campaigners must register as “political 
committees” (more commonly known as political action committees or 
“PACS”) when their major purpose is to influence federal elections.91  
Entities required to register with the FEC (FEC-registered groups) must file 
regular reports with the FEC specifying their contributions and expenditures. 
These reports are filed electronically at quarterly or monthly intervals, although 
                                                                                                                     
 88 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing 
Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1080 
(2011); see also Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information 
Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1890 (2013). 
 89 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 90 Registering as a Candidate, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/registering-candidate/ [https://perma.cc/F48Q-6VQ2].  
 91 FEC Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. § 5595, 5596–97 (Feb. 7, 2007) (to be 
codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
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expenditures on certain types of communications must be reported within 
twenty-four hours.92 FEC-registered groups also must include disclaimers on 
most of their public communications, which are defined by the FEC as any 
general public political advertising, including broadcasts, newspaper and 
magazine ads, and internet ads “placed for a fee” on another person’s website.93 
Consequently, groups that register with the FEC are by definition subject to 
extensive transparency rules. Their contributions and expenditures are disclosed 
in regular public reports, and most of their communications include disclaimers 
stating who authorized and paid for the communication.94  
But not all groups that make campaign-related communications are required 
to register as political parties or committees with the FEC and therefore are not 
subject to these regular disclosure and disclaimer rules.95 The most significant 
of these groups are “social welfare” groups.96 Social welfare groups are a 
category defined by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”, the U.S. federal tax 
agency) for taxation purposes.97 They often are referred to by the IRS code 
provision that defines them: 501(c)(4). Under the applicable statute, to qualify 
for 501(c)(4) status, an organization must not be organized for profit and must 
be operated “exclusively” to promote the social welfare.98 Regulations 
promulgated under the statute, however, permit social welfare groups to engage 
in political activity as long such efforts do not constitute their “primary” 
activity.99  
This has permitted extensive use of 501(c)(4) status by politically active 
groups wishing to avoid FEC regulation. Because they are not defined as 
political committees for purposes of federal campaign law, they are not subject 
                                                                                                                     
 92 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b) (2015); Filing Frequency by Type of Filer, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/dates-and-deadlines/ 
filing-frequency-type-filer/ [https://perma.cc/X3JU-5WUT]. The 24-hour reporting 
requirement applies to expenditures in excess of $10,000 on “electioneering 
communications” as defined in BCRA. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88.  
 93 52 U.S.C. § 30101(22) (Supp. IV 2017); 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (1996). This provision 
is discussed in greater detail below. 
 94 Public Communications, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/press/ 
resources-journalists/public-communications [https://perma.cc/X9VY-R5VZ]. 
 95 See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4) (defining a political committee); see also id. § 30120 
(requiring political committees to disclose certain funding and authorization sources for 
certain public communications). 
 96 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)(a)(2)(i) (2019) (describing the nature of a “social 
welfare” organization as one being “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the 
common good and general welfare of the people”). 
 97 See id. § 1.501(c)(4)(a)(1) (noting a disclosure and disclaimer exemption for civic 
organizations operating “exclusively for the promotion of social welfare”). 
 98 Id.; ERIKA K. LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40183, 
501(C)(4)S AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS UNDER TAX AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 
3 (2013). 
 99 LUNDER & WHITAKER, supra note 98, at 3. 
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to FECA’s regularized disclosure and disclaimer rules.100 Instead, their political 
communications are regulated by separate transparency rules developed by the 
FEC for unregistered groups that nonetheless engage in some election-related 
communications.101 Drawing on the distinction made by the Supreme Court in 
Buckley, these groups need only report expenditures for express advocacy and 
contributions “earmarked” for that advocacy.102 A communication is express 
advocacy for these purposes when it includes the Buckley magic words or the 
functional equivalent thereof.103 A contribution is earmarked when it is 
designated by the donor as given to fund a particular communication.104 FEC 
disclaimer rules developed for these groups track this paradigm, and apply only 
to those of their public communications that expressly advocate for the election 
or defeat of a candidate for federal office.105  
The result of all this is that under FECA, only FEC-registered groups are 
subject to regular disclosure and disclaimer requirements, while non-FEC 
registered groups such as 501(c)(4)s can engage in significant political 
communications while avoiding most disclosure and disclaimer rules. This 
creates an obvious transparency gap. Entities like social welfare groups can 
avoid regular FEC regulation and reporting requirements by limiting their 
election-related advocacy to less than fifty percent of their activity, while also 
avoiding targeted regulation by avoiding words of express advocacy even in 
communications intended to influence federal elections.  
BCRA attempted to partially close this gap by bringing an additional 
category of speech into the U.S. disclosure and disclaimer regime. As required 
by Buckley, BCRA uses a bright-line test to define the category of speech being 
regulated. BCRA defines the communications it regulates—“electioneering 
communications”—as any “broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that 
refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, is publicly distributed 
thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general election, and is 
targeted to the relevant electorate.106 Under BCRA, electioneering 
communications, like express advocacy and the public communications of FEC-
registered groups, must carry disclaimers identifying who is responsible and 
paying for the communication.107 Entities who spend $10,000 or more a year 
                                                                                                                     
 100 See id. 
 101 Id. at 11. See generally Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 88 (discussing the history of 
campaign finance disclosure law and two exemptions to those disclosure laws). 
 102 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–23, 44 (1976). 
 103 This test, which extends slightly beyond the “magic words” test of Buckley, was 
developed by the Supreme Court in 2007, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 
453 (2007). Wisconsin Right to Life imposed a narrowing construction on the definition of 
electioneering communications, holding that the provision was unconstitutional unless read 
to apply only to expenditures that could not “reasonably be viewed” as anything other than 
urging the support or defeat of a candidate for federal office. Id. at 474.  
 104 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1) (2019). 
 105 Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 106 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 107 Id. § 30104(f)(1)–(2). 
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producing or placing electioneering communications also must file a disclosure 
statement with the FEC identifying the names and addresses of those who have 
contributed more than $1000 to fund its communications.108  
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld these transparency provisions in Citizens 
United v. FEC.109 Decided in 2010, Citizens United is better known for striking 
down a ban on the use of corporate general revenue funds to fund a corporation’s 
independent expenditures.110 But the case also addressed the constitutionality 
of disclosure and disclaimer requirements as applied by BCRA to electioneering 
communications.111 The case is important for U.S. transparency law, because 
the core question presented was whether transparency regulations could be 
applied to political communications that did not constitute express advocacy 
under Buckley and its progeny.112 
By an 8–1 vote, the Court upheld the transparency requirements.113 In doing 
so, it found that disclosure and disclaimer rules, like campaign contributions, 
are not direct prohibitions on speech and therefore need only be supported by a 
substantial (rather than compelling) interest.114 The Court further held that 
“shedding the light of publicity”115 on who is financing political speech is such 
an interest, as is providing the electorate with information sufficient to ensure 
that voters are fully informed about who is speaking.116 This type of 
information, the Court said, “enables the electorate to make informed decisions 
and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”117 Importantly, the 
Court was clear that these transparency requirements can be imposed even when 
the communication being regulated does not constitute express advocacy and 
the group speaking is not otherwise regulated by the FEC.118  
Assuming appropriate exceptions are available to protect the privacy of 
smaller donors and to allow for as-applied challenges for entities for whom 
                                                                                                                     
 108 Citizens United v. FEC and the Future of Federal Campaign Finance Reform, LIBR. 
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/citizens-united.php [https://perma.cc/2EV7-
MXDU] (last updated Aug. 16, 2019). 
 109 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370–72 (2010).  
 110 Discussed infra Part IV.C.1.  
 111 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–72. 
 112 Id. at 318–19. 
 113 Id. at 370–72. 
 114 Id. at 366–67. 
 115 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976)). 
 116 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–71. 
 117 Id. at 371. An earlier decision, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995), had cast doubt on this informational interest, as applied to handmade leaflets 
distributed by an individual at a local meeting. The cost of preparing and distributing the 
leaflets at issue in McIntyre was negligible, and would have fallen well below the applicable 
reporting thresholds upheld in Buckley and subsequent cases. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337 
(noting that the defendant had “composed and printed [the leaflets] on her home computer 
and had paid a professional printer to make additional copies”).  
 118 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369. 
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disclosure poses a risk of serious harassment (limitations imposed by the Court 
in earlier cases),119 the U.S. Supreme Court has therefore allowed disclosure 
and disclaimer requirements to attach to a wide array of political 
communications.120 This may not continue: the composition of the Supreme 
Court is changing rapidly, and transparency rules are being challenged across 
the United States.121 But at least under existing law, disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements could be applied to many more online communications than they 
currently are.  
This result has been stymied, however, by BCRA itself and by the FEC. The 
text of BCRA only applies to “broadcast” communications, and the FEC has 
interpreted the statute as not applying to other media, including newspapers, 
magazines, telephones, and the internet.122 This means the only statutory 
transparency requirements currently applicable to online communications are 
the more limited provisions found in FECA, which, as discussed above, only 
apply to the public communications of FEC-registered groups and the express 
advocacy of groups not otherwise regulated by the FEC. Neither the FEC nor 
Congress has as of yet expanded FECA’s coverage to include the broader 
category of electioneering communications as defined in BCRA. This means 
that online “issue ads” (ads not including words of express advocacy) run by 
groups not regulated by the FEC as political parties, candidates, or political 
committees are not subject to any disclosure or disclaimer laws. 
Additionally, the FEC also has been slow to extend even the limited 
disclosure and disclaimer required by FECA to online communications.123 
Instead, it has created a situation in which even ads that would require 
disclaimers if appearing offline (because they are the public communications of 
FEC-registered groups or the express advocacy of other groups) are not always 
required to carry disclaimers when distributed online. The FEC has 
                                                                                                                     
 119 See Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 560–62 (2012) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s finding that the Constitution required a harassment exception to disclosure 
requirements).  
 120 See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 216 F. Supp. 3d 176, 193 (D.D.C. 
2016), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1204 (2017) (summary affirmance upholding the constitutionality of 
FECA large donor disclosure rules to issue-only—i.e., not express advocacy—electioneering 
communications paid for by a social welfare group). 
 121 See Hasen, supra note 119, at 561–62 (illustrating what the Supreme Court in its 
changing composition has recently required to grant an as-applied exception to otherwise 
permissible disclosure requirements). 
 122 BCRA defines “electioneering communications” as any “broadcast, cable and 
satellite communications.” FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS 
BROCHURE 6 (2005), https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ec_brochure.pdf [https 
://perma.cc/S54T-P3WR]. 
 123 See Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to 
Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1709 
n.4 (2009) (“Whatever the reason, the FEC has, over the last several years, shown a 
consistent desire to not regulate the internet.”). 
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accomplished this through a series of regulatory decisions and advisory 
opinions.124 One of the first such decisions came in 2002, when the FEC 
determined that paid text message ads were exempt from an otherwise 
applicable disclaimer requirement under a “small-items” exception125 
developed for things like campaign buttons and bumper stickers.126 Two years 
later, the FEC expanded on this idea by arguing in a lawsuit that it had 
administrative discretion to categorically exclude all digital communications 
from FECA’s disclaimer rules.127 When that position was rejected in court, the 
FEC decided that FECA disclaimers would only be required on digital ads 
“placed for a fee” on the “website” of another.128 This meant that the 
requirement did not apply to communications distributed for free online, 
regardless of the cost of producing the content involved. It also meant the 
requirement did not extend to non-web-based platforms, such as mobile apps. 
That requirement was then even further diluted in 2011, when the FEC 
deadlocked on whether paid ads on Facebook required disclaimers.129 This non-
decision allowed Facebook to host even express advocacy ads without 
disclaimers until 2017, when the FEC finally issued an opinion stating that paid 
advertisements on Facebook were required to carry disclaimers when 
constituting express advocacy or placed by an FEC-registered group.130 
Only in 2018, in the wake of revelations about the 2016 election, did the 
FEC slightly shift course and propose two draft regulations designed to expand 
the transparency of online election-related communications.131 The drafts are 
                                                                                                                     
 124 Advisory Opinions apply only to the specific circumstances presented. They offer 
guidance to similarly situated entities, but do not have the certainty of law or promulgated 
regulations. GARRETT, supra note 39.  
 125 Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Opinion 2002–09 (Aug. 23, 2002). 
 126 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(f)(i) (2019).  
 127 See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 104 (D.D.C. 2004) (“For 
the [FEC] to exercise [such] discretion . . . [it] would require more explicit instruction from 
Congress.”). 
 128 Zainab Smith, Public Hearing on Internet Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION 
(July 18, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/public-hearing-internet-disclaimers-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/G4W2-ASSE]. 
 129 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, I Approved This Facebook Message—But You 
Don’t Know That, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/i-
approved-this-facebook-message-but-you-dont-know-that [https://perma.cc/MG2Z-WY 
QN] (“[T]he six-person FEC couldn’t muster the four votes needed to issue an opinion, with 
three commissioners saying only limited disclosure was required and three saying the ads 
needed no disclosure at all, because it would be ‘impracticable’ for political ads on Facebook 
to contain more text than other ads.”). 
 130 A 2018 study by ProPublica indicated this rule was rarely followed and 
noncompliance was rarely punished. See id. (discovering that fewer than 40 of 300 Facebook 
ads had the FEC-required disclaimers). 
 131 Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of ‘‘Public Communication,” 83 
Fed. Reg. 12,864 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100). The Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking requires all commenters to provide their name, city, and state. Id. 
at 12,864. Presumably, the Commission wants to know who is attempting to influence its 
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substantially similar.132 Both would expand online disclaimer requirements 
beyond “websites” to include paid placements on any digital platform, including 
Facebook, Google, Twitter, Pinterest, and YouTube, and mobile apps; and both 
would attach disclosure requirements to digital communications required to 
carry disclaimers.133  
If adopted, either of these rules would bring more transparency to paid 
online political communications in the United States. But both drafts are limited 
in that they only extend to online ads the current disclaimer rules applicable 
under FECA, not the broader rules enacted in BCRA.134 So, the new online 
disclaimer requirements would apply only to the public communications of 
FEC-registered groups and the express advocacy of other groups, meaning 
entities like social welfare groups will continue to be able to run even paid online 
advertisements without disclaimers as long as they avoid words of express 
advocacy.135 The drafts are similarly limited on the disclosure side. Both drafts 
require disclosure of the identity of the entity paying for the ad, but continue the 
requirement that only earmarked contributions to that entity need be 
disclosed.136 So, while FEC-regulated groups would continue to have to 
disclose virtually all of their contributors,137 the draft rules would allow other 
groups to run even paid express advertisements without disclosing their 
underlying funders unless the funder specifically designates his or her donation 
as for a particular express ad. 
An additional limitation of the draft rules is the continued application of the 
transparency rules only to online communications “placed for a fee” online.138 
Restricting online transparency rules to paid placements means the only 
expenses counting toward the threshold—triggering regulation are those paid to 
the platform hosting the ad. Since online advertising is significantly less 
expensive than its offline counterparts, this means increasing numbers of even 
paid placements could fall below the reporting threshold.139 More significantly, 
                                                                                                                     
decisions, so it can be fully informed about the person or group who is speaking and better 
evaluate the arguments presented. 
 132 The most significant difference between the proposals is their alternative compliance 
standards for communications where full disclosure is considered impossible or impractical. 
Id. at 12,879. 
 133 Id. at 12,869.  
 134 See id. at 12,866. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Political Committees regulated by the FEC must disclose to the FEC the names of all 
donors contributing more than $200. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 138 Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of ‘‘Public Communication,” 83 
Fed. Reg. at 12,868.  
 139 DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING, supra note 83, at ¶¶ 1–10, 62–66 (2018); see also THE LORD 
HODGSON OF ASTLEY ABBOTTS CBE, THIRD-PARTY ELECTION CAMPAIGNING—GETTING 
THE BALANCE RIGHT: REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE THIRD PARTY CAMPAIGNING RULES 
AT THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTION, 2016, Cm. 9205, at 74 (UK); Brendan Fischer, Campaign 
Finance Law in the 21st Century, in CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., EXAMINING FOREIGN 
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it means that extensive costs incurred in producing political communications—
like the millions of dollars spent to train and employ workers at the St. 
Petersburg troll factory140—do not count toward the applicable threshold. Other 
reform proposals being considered in the United States, such as the DISCLOSE 
Act and the Honest Ads Act, also hew to this more conservative path.141  
Again, this restrictive approach is not required by current U.S. law. As 
discussed above, Citizens United explicitly upheld the disclaimer requirements 
BCRA imposed on electioneering communications (broadcast communications 
that run in relevant time period and clearly identify a candidate for federal 
office) even when those communications do not constitute express advocacy.142 
BCRA, unlike FECA, also uses cost of production—not cost of placement—as 
the triggering threshold for its transparency measures.143 So increasing 
transparency by extending BCRA’s definition of “broadcast communications” 
to include online communications should be within the constitutional 
parameters set by the Supreme Court in Citizens United. Lower federal court 
decisions recognize this. A federal district court recently struck down an attempt 
by the FEC to restrict BCRA’s transparency requirements to paid placements 
and exempt social welfare organizations from BCRA’s rules entirely.144 
Additionally, the FEC’s earmarking rule, currently used by the FEC to restrict 
the reach of FECA’s disclosure requirements, has been struck down by a district 
                                                                                                                     
INTERFERENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 16 (2018). See generally 2016 EU REFERENDUM, supra 
note 5. 
 140 This “troll factory” refers to the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg, an 
agency who many commentators argue influenced the outcome of the UK-EU referendum. 
Clare Llewellyn et al., For Whom the Bell Trolls: Shifting Troll Behaviour in the Twitter 
Brexit Debate, 57 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1148, 1148 (2019). 
 141 The Honest Ads Act expands disclosure and disclaimer rules to capture more online 
election communications but does not extend transparency rules to unpaid placements. 
H.R. 4077, 115th Cong. (2017). For a discussion of this history, see Ellen P. Goodman & 
Lyndsey Wajert, The Honest Ads Act Won’t End Social Media Disinformation, But It’s a 
Start 1 (Nov. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery 
.cfm/SSRN_ID3064451_code333377.pdf?abstractid=3064451&mirid=1 [https://perma 
.cc/H8BM-P6FH]. A separate piece of legislation, the DISCLOSE Act, prohibits domestic 
corporations with significant foreign control, ownership, or direction from spending money 
in elections. S. 1585, 115th Cong. § 101 (2017).  
 142 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369–72 (2010). 
 143 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(a)(2) (2015); How to Report Electioneering Communications, 
FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/other-
filers/electioneering-communications/ [https://perma.cc/XF69-BYMM]; Smith, supra note 
128.  
 144 Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 128 (D.D.C. 2004). The court 
held the statute clearly intended the rules to apply to unpaid placements as long as the overall 
expenditure involved in distributing the advertisement exceeded $10,000. Id. at 129. The 
court also struck down the FEC’s categorical exclusion of any electioneering 
communications placed by IRS regulated entities. Id. at 126–27; see also Del. Strong 
Families v. Att’y Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is the conduct of 
an organization, rather than an organization’s status with the Internal Revenue Service, that 
determines whether it makes communications subject to the Act.”).  
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court as inconsistent with FECA itself.145 These rulings indicate that there is 
space within existing law to significantly increase the transparency of online 
communications in the United States. 
2. Transparency in the United Kingdom 
Unlike their U.S. counterparts, legislators in the United Kingdom work 
relatively free of judicial restraints on their ability to impose transparency rules 
on election-related communications. They nonetheless have struggled with 
similar questions of how to define the communications they are regulating, and 
whether to treat online communications the same or differently than their offline 
equivalents. As discussed below, both systems also have failed to require as 
much transparency as would be legally permissible under their respective 
regulatory systems. 
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA) is the 
most significant primary legislation regulating transparency in U.K. 
campaigns.146 As noted above, PPERA limits the campaign expenditures of 
national political parties and third-party campaigners.147 It also requires 
political parties and third-party campaigners to register with the EC,148 and to 
file regular disclosure reports itemizing their contributions and expenditures.149 
Whether a third-party campaigner is required to register with the EC 
depends on whether the group intends to spend more than a threshold amount 
on “regulated campaign activity.”150 Regulated campaign activity includes 
activities that pass the “purpose test.”151 The purpose test defines regulated 
campaign activity as activity directed toward the public that “can be reasonably 
regarded as intended to influence voters.”152 Qualifying activities include 
efforts to influence voters to vote for or against a political party, candidate, or 
                                                                                                                     
 145 See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 422–23 (D.D.C. 2018) (“In contravention of the broad disclosure that 
Congress intended when enacting the 1979 FECA Amendments, this regulation falls 
short . . . .”).  
 146 See Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 c. 41 (UK), http://www 
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC]. 
 147 Id. §§ 41–69. 
 148 Id. § 28. 
 149 Id. § 62. 
 150 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING 4 
(2017), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2019-07/UKPGE-
2017-Overview-of-non-party-regulated-campaign-activity.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EBC-
C4R6] [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING]. 
 151 Id. A 2016 review of the regulation of third-party campaigners in the United 
Kingdom proposed replacing the purpose test with an actual intent requirement. THE LORD 
HODGSON OF ASTLEY ABBOTTS, supra note 139, at 6. Parliament has not acted on this 
proposal. 
 152 NEIL JOHNSTON & JOHN WOODHOUSE, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, EU 
REFERENDUM AND ALLEGED BREACHES OF ELECTION LAW (EMERGENCY DEBATE), 2018, 
CBP 8272 (UK). 
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category of candidate; and that those efforts are aimed at, seen, heard by, or 
involving the public.153 If an activity meets this test, costs counting toward the 
reporting threshold include not just the cost of placing the ad, but all costs 
involved in its production, publication and distribution.154 
The Communications Act 2003 also defines campaign-related activity, for 
the purpose of enforcing its prohibition on the broadcast of political 
advertising.155 As noted above, the scope of communications prohibited by the 
broadcast ban is broad, and includes not just communications from political 
parties, but any communication intended to influence elections, legislators, or 
the public on matters of public dispute.156 This is the most expansive definition 
of election-related communications in U.K. election law. As such, it offers a 
useful test of the willingness of British and European courts to tolerate far-
reaching regulation of political communication.  
It was subject to just such a test in 2008, when a group called Animal 
Defenders International challenged the broadcast ban under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.157 Article 10 protects freedom of 
expression,158 and was incorporated into U.K. domestic law through the Human 
Rights Act 1998.159 Animal Defenders wanted to broadcast an advertisement on 
the BBC.160 The ad featured an image of a girl chained in a cage morphing into 
a chimpanzee while a voiceover provided information about the similar 
capabilities of chimpanzees and young children.161 The objective of the 
campaign, according to the group, was not to influence elections but to draw 
public attention to the use of primates for research and recreational purposes.162 
When the BBC refused to air the ad, Animal Defenders sued.163  
The U.K. Supreme Court (sitting at the time as the Lords of Appeal in the 
House of Lords)164 held the ban was not incompatible with Article 10, even as 
                                                                                                                     
 153 OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING, supra note 150, at 4–5. In the 
Brexit referendum, it was defined as activity “intended to, or are otherwise in connection 
with, promoting or bringing about a particular outcome in the referendum.” JOHNSTON & 
WOODHOUSE, supra note 152. 
 154 See OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING, supra note 150, at 10 
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 155 Communications Act 2003, c. 21, § 321 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
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 157 R (Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [1], [2008] 1 AC 1312 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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 159 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42, § 10 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1998/42/contents [https://perma.cc/Z982-MKWZ]. 
 160 Animal Defenders International [2008] UKHL 15, [4]. 
 161 Id. at [50]. 
 162 Id. at [3]. 
 163 Id. at [4]. 
 164 Id. at [46]. 
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applied to Animal Defenders’ proposed communication.165 The court 
recognized that public scrutiny of different “views, opinions and policies” is 
essential to the democratic process,166 but believed that such scrutiny was best 
achieved by allowing Parliament to enact legislation ensuring a balanced 
presentation of competing ideas, especially on television.167 The court did 
recognize, consistent with European jurisprudence, that Article 10 requires 
restrictions on expression be proportionate to their goals, and that the expansive 
definition of “political advertising” in the Communications Act could be 
considered overly broad.168 But the difficulty of drawing clear lines in this area, 
the court said, meant that the court should defer to the considered judgment of 
Parliament.169 The European Court of Human Rights agreed, and allowed the 
broadcast ban to stand.170  
The key point of Animal Defenders for current purposes is that a very 
expansive definition of political advertising was upheld by both U.K. and 
European courts, using a deferential standard of review. This means equally 
expansive disclosure and imprint (disclaimer) laws—which are much less 
restrictive of political expression than the broadcast ban—would likely face few 
judicial barriers in the United Kingdom. Despite this, lawmakers in the United 
Kingdom, like their counterparts in the United States, have not yet expanded 
their transparency rules to capture the full scope of communications decisions 
like Animal Defenders leave open to them.  
In regard to disclosure, U.K. regulators limit the scope of the nation’s 
reporting regime by only requiring political parties and third-party campaigners 
intending to spend more than a set amount on regulated campaign activities to 
register with the EC and provide regular reports of their contributions and 
expenditures.171 While these registration thresholds are in the same range as 
their U.S. counterparts, the U.K. disclosure system overall is quite different. 
Regulated groups in the United Kingdom are only required to disclose the 
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identity of donors who donate more than £7500 to the group.172 This is much 
higher than the $200 triggering public disclosure in the United States.173 The 
timing of the required reporting also is different. Political parties in the United 
Kingdom must provide regular contribution reports during the run-up to a 
general election,174 but they do not need to report expenditures until three or six 
months after an election (with groups that spend more having longer to 
report).175 Registered third-party campaigners, in turn, are only required to 
report contributions and spending during the regulated period, and third-party 
campaigning outside the regulated period is not reported at all.176 Current 
reporting rules also allow expenditures to be lumped in unhelpful ways, making 
it difficult to trace online spending through the reports, and the EC has only 
limited authority to compel third-party campaign groups to disclose the 
underlying source of the funds they receive.177  
There also are significant differences between the United States and United 
Kingdom in regard to imprint (disclaimer) requirements. Imprint rules in the 
United Kingdom are in several ways more extensive than those found in the 
United States. Any person or group distributing to the public material meeting 
the purpose test must include an imprint on the material, whether or not they are 
required to register with the EC.178 There is no minimum spending threshold 
triggering this obligation.179 Because the purpose test itself is quite broad, this 
means that imprints are required on more types of communications in the United 
Kingdom than in the United States. But there is one big exception to this: as of 
this writing there is no imprint requirement applicable to online 
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communications.180 The U.K. government has agreed to develop rules requiring 
online imprints, but has not yet done so.181 As the robust online campaign during 
the Brexit referendum made clear, this leaves a gaping hole in the United 
Kingdom’s transparency regime.  
Scotland experimented with plugging that hole during the 2015 vote on 
Scottish independence. The parliaments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland enjoy certain devolved powers, including the ability to regulate local 
elections.182 Exercising this power, the Scottish Parliament required any 
material “wholly or mainly related” to the independence referendum to include 
an imprint, regardless of whether the material was distributed on or off line.183 
The “wholly or mainly related” test was even broader than the purpose test used 
in nationwide elections, and there was no threshold spending requirement—any 
communication meeting the test was required to carry an imprint.184 This 
created a sweeping online imprint requirement.  
It was only partially successful. In a report submitted to Parliament after the 
Scottish referendum, the EC noted that the scope of the disclosure requirement 
meant that a potentially wide amount of online material was captured by the 
rule, and that this had created confusion among campaigners about what 
communications were in fact required to carry imprints.185 In particular, the EC 
reported receiving questions about whether communications posted on personal 
Facebook and Twitter accounts were within the scope of the rule, and if so where 
on these pages the imprints should appear.186 The EC’s response was to advise 
campaigners that social media accounts “focused primarily on campaigning” 
needed to carry imprints on their Facebook homepage or Twitter profile, but that 
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individuals or organizations who were “just expressing their views” through 
their own accounts were not covered by the requirement.187  
As the EC acknowledged in its post-election report, the distinction between 
using a social media account to focus primarily on campaigning versus using 
one to simply express your own views is far from crisp, and will require 
clarification if online imprint requirements become the norm in U.K. 
elections.188 Nonetheless, the Scottish referendum provides a useful first look at 
a real-world effort to provide greater campaign transparency online.  
3. Transparency Recap 
As evidenced by the number and prominence of proposed reforms in this 
category, increasing transparency around online communications is an 
important tool in combatting disinformation and foreign interference in 
democratic elections. Fortunately, U.S. and U.K. laws regulating transparency 
are sufficiently similar to allow each country to learn from the other in this area. 
In both countries, disclaimer and disclosure rules can be triggered either by who 
you are or what you say. Both countries also require that candidates, political 
parties, and some third-party campaigners report their income and expenditures 
to an agency overseeing election activity. Both countries likewise require many 
political communications to carry disclaimers, but not all election-related 
communications are included in those requirements, especially when occurring 
online.  
The legal challenges facing each country in this area also are surprisingly 
similar. Both countries are struggling with how to design online disclaimer and 
disclosure requirements that balance the regulatory burden imposed by such 
requirements with the need for public awareness of who is authorizing and 
paying for online campaigns. The United States can gain valuable insights by 
in-depth study of the groundbreaking Scottish experiment with online imprints, 
while the United Kingdom has much to learn from careful consideration of the 
long path already trod by U.S. courts and legislatures trying to distinguish 
regulated campaign communications from unregulated political expression. 
These are not easy issues, and the experiences of the two countries have much 
to offer each other in evaluating them.  
The United States also could learn from the United Kingdom’s experience 
using pay-to-produce rather than a pay-to-place thresholds for online disclosure 
and disclaimer requirements. Online advertising is significantly less expensive 
than its offline counterparts, and often is shared organically between users rather 
than by the initial distributor. Developing regulatory thresholds that capture the 
actual expenses incurred in implementing these types of campaigns is critical to 
increasing transparency, but is tricky to do well. The United Kingdom has more 
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experience than the United States in using this measure, and U.S. lawmakers 
can benefit from that experience as they consider the appropriate reach of 
proposed reforms like those found in the DISCLOSE and Honest Ads Acts. 
There are other insights to be gleaned as well. In the United States, the 
reports regularly filed by FEC-registered groups provide more timely and 
detailed information than those collected by the EC. The U.S. system therefore 
could provide useful guidance as the United Kingdom considers whether and 
how to change the timing and nature of its own reporting system to increase its 
value to voters. The United States, in turn, has much to gain by careful review 
of the decisions the United Kingdom has made in regard to balancing 
transparency with the privacy interests of smaller donors. This issue is becoming 
more important in the United States as disclosure rules come under increased 
pressure; the United Kingdom experience using a significantly higher public 
disclosure threshold than that found in the United States may hold valuable 
lessons for the U.S. reform community.  
C. Source Exclusions  
Unlike transparency rules, source exclusions prohibit some entities from 
participating in a nation’s democratic deliberations at all, even if their 
participation is fully disclosed. Most countries that regulate money in politics 
prohibit or restrict the election-related activities of foreign entities in some 
way,189 and reform proposals in this category are generally geared toward 
strengthening those rules. In the United States and United Kingdom, these 
proposals include increasing and better enforcing restrictions on political 
expenditures by foreign actors, non-citizens, and subsidiaries of foreign-owned 
corporations;190 requiring online platforms to verify the domestic identity of 
entities purchasing online campaign communications;191 and tightening 
prohibitions on foreign contributions to candidates and political parties.192  
Despite their ubiquity, source exclusions raise a host of problems. To start 
with, defining “foreign” can be surprisingly problematic, particularly in regard 
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to multi-generational diaspora communities and transnational corporations.193 
It also can be challenging to operationalize source exclusions online, where 
information readily crosses borders and original sources are easily obscured.194 
Finally, it can be difficult to articulate a legally compelling reason why a voter 
should be prevented from hearing a properly attributed message just because of 
the foreign status of the messenger—and not everyone agrees such restrictions 
are appropriate.195 Addressing these issues is critical to crafting and defending 
workable foreign source exclusion rules in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  
1. Source Exclusions in the United States 
Restrictions on foreign involvement in domestic elections have been part of 
U.S. law since at least 1938, when Congress enacted the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (FARA) in response to fears that German nationals were being 
paid to distribute Nazi propaganda in the United States.196 The restrictions were 
tightened in the 1960s, after a Senate investigation revealed that campaign 
contributions had been channeled to congressional candidates by Filipino sugar 
industry magnates,197 and again in the 1990s after reports of Chinese nationals 
using “soft money” donations to gain access to high-level government officials 
in the Clinton Administration.198  
The distinction developed in Buckley between campaign contributions and 
expenditures shapes this legal landscape as well. In regard to contributions, 
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candidates and political parties are categorically prohibited from soliciting, 
accepting, or receiving donations from foreign nationals.199 It is likewise illegal 
for a foreign national to directly or indirectly contribute money or other “things 
of value” to a candidate in any federal, state, or local election.200 FECA also 
prohibits knowingly assisting foreign nationals in circumventing the foreign 
source exclusion ban, while FARA prevents circumvention by prohibiting U.S. 
agents from making contributions on behalf of their foreign principals.201 These 
rules have consistently been upheld under the Buckley paradigm subjecting 
regulations of contributions to a relatively relaxed level of constitutional 
scrutiny.202  
Source-based expenditure bans present a more complicated legal question 
in the United States. The Supreme Court dealt with source-based expenditures 
bans most recently in Citizens United.203 As discussed above, Citizens United 
upheld the broad disclosure and disclaimer requirements imposed by BCRA on 
broadcast electioneering communications. But the case is better known for 
striking down a source-based ban on the use of corporate general revenue funds 
to fund the independent expenditures of corporations. Prior to Citizens United, 
U.S. law permitted corporations to use these funds to purchase “issue ads” but 
they were prohibited from using them to purchase express advocacy (under 
FECA) or electioneering communications deemed the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy (under BCRA and subsequent court decisions).204 The Court 
held in Citizens United that this source-based expenditure ban violated the First 
Amendment.205 
In doing so, the Citizens United Court used sweeping language to condemn 
source-based regulations of political speech.206 The government, the Court said, 
may not “deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself 
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”207 This strong rhetoric 
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cast constitutional doubt on all source-based expenditure restrictions, including 
the foreign-source bans found in both FECA and BCRA.208 So it was not 
surprising when the federal district court for the District of Columbia was asked 
just a year after Citizens United was decided to consider whether those bans 
were also unconstitutional.  
The case, Bluman v. FEC, involved two foreign nationals legally living in 
the United States who wanted to make express advocacy expenditures 
supporting candidates for federal office but were prevented from doing so by 
BCRA’s foreign expenditure ban.209 Writing for the majority, then-Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh upheld the law.210 In doing so, he brought into play a line of 
Supreme Court decisions, present but not emphasized in Citizens United, 
establishing the constitutional permissibility of excluding foreigners from 
certain tasks considered central to democratic self-government.211 The gist of 
these cases is that excluding foreign nationals from activities “intimately 
related” to the process of self-government is constitutionally acceptable, even 
when such distinctions would not be tolerated elsewhere.212 As the Bluman 
court noted, this doctrine has been used by the Supreme Court to uphold laws 
excluding foreign nationals from serving as jurors, holding elected office, and 
voting.213 The power to exclude foreign nationals from such areas, the Bluman 
court said, is a core component of a nation’s right and duty to preserve itself as 
a political community; to define, in other words, who is and is not a member of 
a given polis.214  
Drawing on this line of cases, Bluman held that the First Amendment did 
not bar the government from trying to restrict foreign influence over how voters 
cast their ballots, at least to the extent presented in the case before the court 
(which was limited to express advocacy).215 Elections, the court said, are “an 
integral aspect” of the process of self-governance, and spending money to 
influence voters is “at least as (and probably far more)”216 closely related to 
democratic self-government than other tasks the Supreme Court had applied the 
doctrine to, such as serving as a probation officer or public school teacher.217 
Nothing in Citizens United precluded this result, according to the Bluman court, 
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and the self-governance line of cases dictated it.218 Therefore, limiting foreign 
influence over American democracy was a sufficiently compelling interest to 
justify the foreign source expenditures ban being challenged.219  
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Bluman.220 But there is 
considerable tension between Citizens United, which is deeply skeptical of the 
legitimacy of source-based bans and reserves to voters the power to critically 
assess political information, and the rationale of Bluman, which emphasizes the 
power and duty of sovereign states to protect voters from foreign influence even 
when properly disclosed.221 This uncertainty caused difficulties almost 
immediately after Bluman was decided when the FEC was presented with a 
complaint alleging that a foreign national spent $327,000 opposing a California 
ballot referendum.222  
The FEC commissioners could not agree whether to act on the complaint.223 
The disagreement turned on whether Bluman’s validation of foreign expenditure 
bans in a candidate election logically extended to a ban on foreign expenditures 
in a referendum.224 The legal distinction between candidate elections and 
referendums dated to before Citizens United, when the Supreme Court had held 
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti that corporations could not be 
prohibited from using general corporate revenue funds to fund expenditures 
related to a referendum campaign.225 The Bellotti Court’s reasoning was that 
there was no candidate in a referendum campaign who could be “corrupted” by 
corporate money, and therefore no risk of quid pro quo corruption justifying the 
restriction.226  
The FEC commissioners in favor of dismissing the California complaint 
argued that Bellotti, not Bluman, governed because the complaint involved a 
ballot referendum, not a candidate election.227 The FEC commissioners in favor 
of advancing it argued that Bluman’s language regarding the importance of 
protecting democratic self-governance established a distinct compelling interest 
justifying foreign source exclusions that applied with equal force in candidate 
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and referendum campaigns.228 Bluman, those commissioners argued, had 
carved out a “no-go” zone for foreign participation in American politics that 
applied regardless of the nature of the underlying vote.229 Because the 
commissions deadlocked over this issue, the FEC took no action on the 
complaint.230 
The dispute over the California complaint reveals an important and 
unresolved issue in U.S. law regarding foreign source exclusion bans. Since 
Buckley, opponents of campaign finance regulation have argued that the only 
constitutionally acceptable justification supporting such regulations is the 
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.231 
Except for a brief deviation in 1990, the Supreme Court has generally seemed 
to agree.232 The unresolved issue is whether that limitation also applies to 
foreign source bans. The commissioners’ disagreement in the California case 
pushes this point. If the only constitutionally acceptable reason to permit foreign 
source bans is to prevent the appearance or actuality of quid pro quo corruption, 
then such a ban could not be constitutionally applied to a referendum campaign 
where there is no candidate to corrupt. If, on the other hand, the Bluman 
rationale about protecting voters from foreign influence is a constitutionally 
acceptable justification distinct from concerns about quid pro quo candidate 
corruption, then it should apply with equal force to both candidate and 
referendum campaigns. As the dispute between the FEC commissioners in the 
California case demonstrates, the lack of clarity on this point leaves unclear both 
the scope and justification of U.S. foreign source exclusion laws.233 
2. Source Exclusions in the United Kingdom 
The law governing source exclusions in the United Kingdom is similar to 
that in the United States. Once again, the relevant primary legislation is PPERA. 
When PPERA was enacted, there was significant concern about foreign 
donations made in the 1990s to British political parties, particularly Prime 
Minister John Major’s Conservative Party, which had been criticized for 
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accepting donations tied to Serbia, Cyprus, and Russia.234 The Labour Party 
leveraged those concerns in the 1997 general election by including a foreign 
source ban in its election manifesto.235 When Labour won, the new government 
asked the Neill Committee to include the ban in its study of political party 
funding reforms. The PPERA, as noted above, was the end result of the Neill 
Committee’s work.236 
Under PPERA, contributions to political parties and registered third-party 
campaigners can only be accepted from “permissible donors.”237 Permissible 
donors include individuals registered on a U.K. electoral register, U.K.-
registered political parties, U.K.-registered business organizations, and 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations registered and doing business in the United 
Kingdom.238 British citizens living abroad are permissible donors, as are non-
citizen residents legally living in the United Kingdom.239 Political parties and 
registered third parties are statutorily responsible for verifying that the donations 
they accept are from permissible donors, and they are legally obligated to return 
donations that cannot be verified.240 Additionally, only entities who are 
themselves permissible donors can register as third-party campaigners.241 
Because they cannot register as third-party campaigners, foreign entities also 
therefore cannot legally engage in regulated campaign spending exceeding the 
registration threshold.242 
In recommending these rules, the Neill Committee, like the court in Bluman, 
relied on concepts of national self-governance and the democratic process.243 
British political parties, the Committee reasoned, are chosen by and responsible 
to British citizens, and their actions should not be influenced by outsiders with 
no “genuine stake” in the country.244 Therefore, only those who live, work, or 
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do business in the United Kingdom should be “entitled to support financially 
the operation of the political process.”245 But the Neill Committee had to 
grapple with some sensitive issues in deciding how to implement this idea in the 
United Kingdom. It struggled with two questions in particular, both of which 
would become relevant years later in the Brexit campaign: how to define 
“foreign” in a country comprised of distinct nations with large diaspora 
populations and varying levels of devolved power, and how to prevent foreign 
corporations from channeling outside funds through subsidiaries registered in 
the United Kingdom.246  
Defining “foreign” in the United Kingdom context was the Neill 
Committee’s first challenge. If everyone who was not a U.K. citizen and resident 
was considered an impermissible donor, the Scottish National Party and Plaid 
Cymru (the Scottish and Welsh independence parties) would be 
disproportionately—and in their view unfairly—disadvantaged.247 Under such 
a ban, their candidates would face Labour and Conservative Party opponents 
who could be funded by English money while being unable to raise competing 
funds from their own supporters abroad.248 These parties historically had been 
supported financially by their expatriates, and they considered those expats to 
be no differently situated than English nationals who donated money to pro-
union candidates standing for election in Scotland or Wales.249 The relationship 
of Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland raised additional problems, both 
in terms of who would be considered “foreign” for purposes of donating to 
political parties in Northern Ireland, and whether those donations should be 
publicly disclosed in a still-volatile political environment.250  
These concerns led the Neill Committee to recommend a nuanced approach 
to foreign source bans. It decided against creating general exceptions for foreign 
supporters of national independence parties, but partially appeased the concerns 
of those parties by including U.K. citizens living abroad as permissible 
donors.251 The Neill Committee went further in regard to Northern Ireland, 
concluding that both pragmatic concerns and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement 
warranted allowing Irish citizens and companies doing the business in the 
Republic of Ireland to be treated as not foreign for purposes of donations to 
Northern Irish political parties.252 The Committee also recommended that 
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political donations in Northern Ireland be given a short-term exemption from 
otherwise applicable public disclosure rules.253 These recommendations were 
accepted by the government and adopted in PPERA,254 with the additional 
caveat that Northern Irish political parties were prohibited from making 
donations to parties and other regulated entities in the greater United Kingdom 
to avoid circumvention of the foreign source ban outside of Northern Ireland.255  
Corporate money presented a second challenge to the Neill Committee. 
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has never had a generally 
applicable ban on corporate contributions or expenditures. The Committee 
struggled with whether or not U.K.-registered subsidiaries of foreign companies 
should be considered permissible donors.256 Because such subsidiaries were 
presumed to be doing business in the United Kingdom, they were directly 
affected by U.K. law and arguably part of the U.K. political community.257 But 
because they were subsidiaries of foreign corporations, they also were possible 
conduits of foreign money promoting foreign interests.258 Partnerships 
comprised of international members and limited liability companies presented 
variations of the same problem.259 
The Neill Committee adopted a compromise approach here as well, 
recommending that U.K.-registered subsidiaries be included as permissible 
donors but that they be required to demonstrate that they had sufficient U.K.-
based business activity to independently fund their U.K. donations.260 The 
legislation ultimately accepted the Committee’s recommendation that 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations must be both registered and doing business 
in the United Kingdom to qualify as permissible donors, but did not require such 
entities to demonstrate that their U.K. donations could be supported by revenue 
generated within the country.261 
Under PPERA, U.K. law bans foreign contributions but defines 
“foreignness” in ways designed to be sensitive to the history and circumstances 
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of the United Kingdom’s constitutive parts.262 For enforcement purposes, the 
law puts the burden on parties, candidates, and registered third-party 
campaigners to verify that they only accept donations from permissible donors, 
and requires that they return funds whose origins cannot be ascertained.263 It 
also prohibits foreign entities from registering as third-party campaigners, 
thereby rendering it illegal for such entities to spend above the triggering 
threshold on any regulated campaign activities, which includes most activity 
intended to influence voters during an election period.264 
Despite this relatively nuanced approach, the issues that troubled the Neill 
Committee reappeared during the Brexit referendum. In fact, the largest scandal 
to emerge from the Brexit campaign involved fears that foreign money had been 
channeled to several pro-Leave campaign groups through a web of 
interconnected corporations.265 The concerns centered on U.K. businessman 
Arron Banks and an entity he created called Leave.EU.266 Leave.EU registered 
with the EC as a third-party campaigner and reported receiving millions of 
pounds of donations from Banks.267 It then used these funds to finance not only 
its own campaign, but also to make large donations to five separately registered 
pro-Leave groups.268  
When these transactions became public, concerns were raised about whether 
Banks, whose business ventures appeared from public records to have limited 
cash flow and high debt loads, had actually been the source of these funds.269 In 
response, the EC opened an investigation.270 The investigation revealed that 
Leave.EU had operated its campaign through a separate entity, Better for the 
Country Limited (BFTC), and that BFTC had received £6 million in funding to 
pay Leave.EU’s referendum expenses and an additional £2 million to use for 
other referendum spending in the form of donations to other registered campaign 
groups.271 BFTC reported that this entire amount—£8 million—was received 
from Banks in the form of donations or loans from him or his U.K.-based 
insurance companies.272 BFTC was incorporated by Banks in the United 
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Kingdom in May 2015, and it was not improper or illegal for Leave.EU to run 
its referendum campaign through BFTC.273  
What the EC was concerned about was the involvement of Rock Holdings 
Limited, another Banks entity incorporated in the Isle of Man.274 Rock Holdings 
is not registered or doing business in the United Kingdom, and is not a 
permissible donor under U.K. law.275 So money or loans supplied by Rock 
Holdings could potentially violate the U.K. foreign source ban. The EC’s post-
Brexit report to Parliament itemized these concerns.276 The EC reported that it 
believed there were reasonable grounds to suspect that Rock Holdings was a 
party to the donations and loans made by Banks to BFTC and used to fund 
Leave.EU and, through it, other pro-Leave campaigners.277 The report also 
stated that the EC had reason to believe that Banks knew this, that he 
intentionally used prohibited foreign sources to fund campaign activities, and 
that he concealed the true source of those funds in violation of U.K. law.278 The 
EC referred the matter to the National Crime Agency,279 which subsequently 
cleared Banks and Rock Holdings of criminal wrongdoing.280 The EC in 
response has recommended additional election law changes to close what it sees 
as a loophole in the United Kingdom’s foreign source funding ban.281  
The Banks matter is not the only foreign funding scandal to emerge from 
Brexit. There also was concern during the referendum that the non-disclosure 
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provision of PPERA in relation to contributions made to political parties in 
Northern Ireland was used to shield the source of funds used to purchase anti-
EU advertising throughout the United Kingdom.282 These concerns involved an 
entity called the Constitutional Research Counsel (CRC), an unincorporated 
organization based in Scotland.283 During the Brexit referendum, the CRC gave 
£435,000 to the Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).284 The 
DUP is the dominant party in Northern Ireland’s devolved parliament, and the 
only Northern Irish party to sit in the Westminster Parliament.285  
The CRC’s £435,000 donation to the DUP was the largest ever made in 
Northern Ireland.286 But because at the time of the Brexit campaign PPERA 
prohibited public disclosure of political donations in Northern Ireland, the 
underlying funding sources of CRC itself were not publicly disclosed.287 
Disclosure reports made by the DUP to the EC showed that much of this money 
was used to fund anti-EU messaging throughout the United Kingdom, including 
a full-page newspaper ad in London and targeted Facebook ads arranged by 
Aggregate IQ (a Canadian data firm linked to Cambridge Analytica and also 
implicated in the allegedly improper use of Facebook user data).288  
Restrictions on public disclosure of Northern Ireland political party funding 
have been lifted since the Brexit vote, but the EC remains prohibited by law 
from providing information about donations that were legally confidential at the 
time they were made.289 The EC’s Chief Commissioner told a Parliamentary 
committee that the EC had verified that the donors listed on the DUP election 
reports were permissible, but was prohibited by law from elaborating further.290 
This lack of public disclosure about the CRC’s underlying funding has spurred 
continuing suspicions about the propriety of these transactions.291  
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The Brexit campaign revealed additional gaps in the United Kingdom’s 
foreign source exclusion laws. As noted above, PPERA requires any third-party 
campaigner intending to spend over the threshold amount on regulated activities 
to register with the EC.292 Impermissible donors, including foreign entities, 
cannot legally register and therefore cannot legally engage in spending over the 
threshold amount.293 But it appears there is no provision in U.K. law preventing 
foreign actors from spending under the registration threshold. Consequently, in 
the Brexit referendum, foreign actors could spend up to £10,000 on election 
activity without running afoul of the law.294 A similar issue exists on the 
donation side: foreign entities are not permissible donors, but “donations” are 
defined as contributions of £500 or more.295 Since contributions under £500 are 
not “donations,” they also are not governed by the permissible donor 
requirements.296  
These gaps mean that much Brexit-related content promoted on social 
media by foreign actors did not violate U.K. law. While foreign-funded 
Facebook activity seems to have played less of a role in the Brexit referendum 
than in the United States presidential election, reviews conducted after the 
referendum indicate that Russian entities did purchase some Brexit-related 
advertisements, and data released by Twitter shows accounts affiliated with the 
St. Petersburg operation promoted Brexit tweets.297 But as long as the cost of 
these communications was under the third-party campaigner registration 
threshold of £10,000, these expenditures would have been legally 
permissible.298  
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Another problem in the U.K. regulatory scheme became apparent only after 
the Brexit referendum, as Parliament struggled to approve a plan 
operationalizing the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. Because 
PPERA’s third-party campaigner expenditure rules only apply during the 
regulated period leading up to an election and only cover communications 
intended to influence voters, paid advertisements placed outside that period 
purportedly targeting elected officials are effectively unregulated.299 What this 
meant during the Brexit negotiations was that in early 2019, as the U.K. 
Government tried to obtain approval of its exit plan, hundreds of thousands of 
pounds worth of social media ads placed on Facebook and other platforms 
pushing for a “no-deal” exit were not covered by U.K. disclosure or disclaimer 
laws.300 Transparency measures voluntarily adopted by Facebook show that a 
group called “Britain’s Future” purchased the ads, but because the ads were 
placed outside of a regulated election period and purportedly targeted ministers 
rather than voters (by telling them to “vote no” on the deal), the British people 
were completely in the dark about who was funding the online campaign.301  
The United Kingdom, like the United States, is considering various ways to 
address these issues. The prohibition on public disclosure of political 
contributions in Northern Ireland has already been lifted, and the EC has asked 
the Government to allow it to retroactively disclose what it knows about Brexit 
referendum funding in Northern Ireland.302 The U.K. Information 
Commissioner, as well as the EC, has recommended that the Banks/Rock 
Holdings situation be addressed by adopting the Neill Committee’s original 
proposal of requiring U.K.-based subsidiaries of foreign corporations to 
demonstrate that their U.K. businesses generate sufficient revenue to cover their 
political spending.303 There also are proposals to improve the ability of political 
parties, candidates, and third-party campaigners to verify the source of the funds 
they receive,304 to tighten rules regarding the flow of money between Northern 
Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, and to close the gaps created by the 
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wording of the third-party campaigner registration threshold and foreign 
donation ban. The EC also has recommended studying whether and how the 
regulated period should be adjusted, to better capture the nature of today’s 
ongoing online influence campaigns. 
3. Foreign Source Exclusion Recap 
Once again, there is much in these reform proposals warranting comparative 
consideration, and very little that is barred by current U.S. constitutional law. 
Legislators in the United States are struggling with the same question as their 
U.K. counterparts regarding how to define foreignness in regard to subsidiaries 
of foreign held corporations.305 The Neill Committee’s careful and 
comprehensive consideration of the underlying justifications for foreign source 
bans, and its nuanced application of that justification when defining the relevant 
political communities in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, surely will be 
of value to U.S. advocates as cases like Bluman wind their way to the Supreme 
Court. The Northern Ireland experience also offers a useful comparison as U.S. 
courts work to define the appropriate scope of the abuse and harassment 
exceptions to U.S. disclosure laws. Finally, the FEC, which has struggled with 
the broader question of how to justify a foreign source ban in referendums (when 
there is no candidate to “corrupt”) would benefit from the rich discussion of this 
issue engaged in by the Neill Committee and continuing today as the United 
Kingdom modifies its rules for non-candidate referendums and perpetual 
campaigns.306  
The United Kingdom, in turn, could learn from the extensive experience the 
United States has had with a regulatory system not restricted to a defined pre-
election period.307 The U.S. system has grappled for decades with the problems 
associated with balancing this type of ongoing regulation with the need to 
maintain both donor privacy and space for robust political speech.308 
Lawmakers in the United States have done this in the shadow of the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, but the same normative challenges 
exist regardless of that judicial overlay.309 The United Kingdom could benefit 
from this experience when contemplating whether and how to extend its own 
regulatory regime. 
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D. Content Exclusions 
Unlike source exclusions, content exclusions restrict communications on 
the basis of what they say.310 They are the most controversial type of regulation, 
and invariably generate accusations of censorship, particularly in the United 
States.311 This also is the class in the taxonomy in which U.S. and U.K. laws are 
the most distinct. But it oversimplifies both U.S. and U.K. law to believe that 
the two systems are so different that there is no fruitful ground, even here, for 
comparative study. As shown below, despite its frequent insistence to the 
contrary, U.S. First Amendment law tolerates content-based regulation in many 
contexts, and recent content-based reform proposals in the United Kingdom are 
far less far-reaching than they can sound (to American ears) on first impression.  
1. Content Exclusions in the United States 
It is black letter law that the First Amendment requires strict scrutiny of 
regulations distinguishing speech on the basis of its content.312 Little else is 
clear about this area, however, including the basic question of how to determine 
whether a law is or is not content-based.313 There also are numerous exceptions 
to the strict scrutiny rule, and sometimes even content-based regulations 
subjected to strict scrutiny survive and are upheld as constitutional.314  
These legal nuances take several forms. First, there are several content-
based types of speech, such as perjury and fraud, that are considered 
categorically outside the protection of the First Amendment.315 Regulation and 
even prohibitions of these categories of speech are constitutionally acceptable 
as long as they are viewpoint neutral.316 Second, even constitutionally protected 
speech can be regulated in some situations if the regulation advances a 
substantial interest unrelated to the suppression of speech, such as prohibiting 
the use of profanity in governmental buildings or prohibiting harassment in 
public workplaces.317 Third, speech can be regulated on the basis of its content 
if it presents a clear, serious, and imminent danger to people or property—the 
classic example of which is falsely crying “fire” in a crowded theater.318 
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Additionally, in exceptional cases, even viewpoint-based regulations can 
survive strict scrutiny review and be upheld as constitutional, as long as the 
regulation is sufficiently narrowly drawn to advance a compelling interest, such 
as criminalizing “true threats” against the life of the President.319 
Each of these doctrines is complex and contested; the important point for 
current purposes is to illustrate that despite its frequently absolutist rhetoric, 
U.S. constitutional law permits content-based restrictions for a variety of 
reasons under a variety of doctrines. These doctrines have been applied even in 
the realm of political communications.320 The clearest example of this is the 
long-standing acceptance of state laws banning campaigning in or near polling 
stations.321 All fifty U.S. states have such laws, many of which have been in 
place for more than 100 years.322 Although its reasoning has varied, the 
Supreme Court has consistently upheld these laws as long as they are 
reasonable, viewpoint neutral, and not overly broad.323  
Efforts to regulate campaign speech on the basis that it is misleading or 
untruthful have had more mixed success. The Supreme Court’s most recent 
decision in this area, United States v. Alvarez, involved the Stolen Valor Act, a 
federal statute that penalized falsely claiming to hold certain types of military 
honors.324 In a split decision, a plurality of justices struck down the law.325 In 
doing so, they refused to accept the government’s argument that false speech, 
like perjury and other existing content-based exclusions, is categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment.326 The plurality also refused to apply a 
reduced standard of review just because the speech being regulated was 
verifiably false.327 Instead, the plurality held that laws punishing false 
statements will be subject to strict scrutiny unless there is an additional “legally 
cognizable harm” associated with the false statement justifying less rigorous 
review.328 The plurality opinion gave several examples of laws that fulfill this 
criteria, including perjury laws (which protect the integrity of the courts), laws 
prohibiting misrepresenting yourself as a representative of the government 
(which protect the integrity of governmental processes), and anti-fraud laws 
(which protect against consumer and financial harms).329 
Alvarez is a mixed bag for content-based election law reform proposals. The 
plurality was plainly skeptical of applying anything less than strict judicial 
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scrutiny to new types of content-based regulations of speech.330 The Justices—
including the dissenting Justices—expressed particular concern that content-
based rules in the political realm risk chilling protected political speech.331 
Nonetheless, the plurality’s recognition that preventing fraud, 
misrepresentation, and the integrity of governmental processes are cognizable 
harms justifying less rigorous judicial scrutiny may leave open a path for a 
carefully crafted false statement rule even in the electoral realm.332  
An earlier Supreme Court case, Brown v. Hartlage, shows one possible 
approach.333 In Hartlage, the Court considered a Kentucky law that punished a 
candidate (Brown) for promising to take a smaller salary than entitled to if 
elected.334 Brown apparently made the statement without realizing that state law 
prohibited him from taking a salary reduction.335 Brown won the election, and 
the losing candidate claimed Brown’s statement violated the state Corrupt 
Practices Act, which among other things penalized candidates for state office 
from making false or misleading statements.336 The state courts sided with 
Brown’s opponent, and nullified the election.337 Brown appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, arguing that applying the Corrupt Practices Act to his situation 
violated the First Amendment.338 The Supreme Court agreed with Kentucky that 
protecting the integrity of elections was a compelling interest and that 
“demonstrable falsehoods,” even in the context of political campaigns, do not 
have the same protection as truthful statements.339 Nonetheless, the Court 
invalidated the application of the law to Brown’s statement because there had 
been no showing that it had been made in bad faith, with knowledge that it was 
false, or with “reckless disregard” of its truth.340  
This language borrows heavily from U.S. defamation law. Defamation law 
has had a constitutional component in the United States since 1965 when the 
Supreme Court held in New York Times v. Sullivan that defamation law could 
not be used to punish minor, unintentional untruths about public officials.341 
Instead, the Sullivan Court said, the First Amendment protects even defamatory 
statements about public officials as long as the statements are not made with 
“actual malice.”342 As echoed by the Court in Hartlage,343 “actual malice” is 
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defined as making false statements of material fact with either actual knowledge 
or reckless disregard of the statement’s truth or falsity.344 Speakers are thereby 
constitutionally protected from liability for unintentional or even negligent 
errors, minor untruths, and non-factual statements such as satire, opinion, and 
hyperbole.345 This doctrine does not protect intentional lies.346 Indeed, it does 
just the opposite: an intentional lie about a verifiable material fact is precisely 
what can be punished under Sullivan.347  
States have relied on this distinction when defending state laws regulating 
untrue statements in election campaigns. The federal appellate courts, however, 
appear—at least at first blush—to be unconvinced. The Eighth348 and Sixth349 
Circuit courts of appeals have struck down prosecutions under false speech laws 
in Minnesota and Ohio, respectively. In each case, state courts had interpreted 
the state statutes as applying only to speech meeting the Sullivan standard, but 
the federal courts nonetheless held that the First Amendment barred the state 
prosecution.350  
But these decisions are less determinative than they appear, for two reasons. 
First, in each case, the underlying statement involved was not obviously 
verifiable as true or false. In Ohio, the underlying statement accused a member 
of Congress of voting for “taxpayer-funded abortion” by supporting the 
Affordable Care Act—a complex statute that expanded reproductive health care 
generally but did not specifically appropriate federal funds for abortion care.351 
The Minnesota case was more complicated, but the court seemed skeptical that 
the underlying statements giving rise to the complaint had been demonstrably 
false.352 Neither case, therefore, presented a crisp opportunity for a court to 
evaluate the core question of whether a narrowly drawn statute applied only to 
false statements of verifiable fact would pass First Amendment scrutiny. 
Second, even while striking down the statutes in front of them the courts in 
both cases affirmed that states are not powerless to regulate all false or 
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misleading statements in the political realm. The Eighth Circuit unequivocally 
rejected any such interpretation of its decision, stating “[w]e do not, of course, 
hold today that a state may never regulate false speech in this context.”353 The 
Sixth Circuit likewise emphasized that the plaintiff was not asserting (and it was 
not affirming) a constitutional “right to lie” in election campaigns.354 Instead, 
both courts held only that false campaign statements are not categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment—a relatively unremarkable holding, 
echoed by the Supreme Court in Alvarez.355 Additionally, both courts readily 
acknowledged that preserving the integrity of democratic elections is a 
compelling governmental interest, even though the states had failed to 
sufficiently narrow the reach of the statutes in the cases presented.356  
These cases leave open the possibility that a carefully drawn and applied 
regulation of false or misleading campaign speech could be upheld, even if 
subjected to heighted review. Which is not to say it would be: laws restricting 
political speech rarely survive judicial review in the United States, and a deep 
skepticism of any governmental process adjudicating the truth or falsity of 
political statements undergirds all of these opinions. But a carefully crafted law 
advancing a well-defined interest in protecting the integrity of elections could 
address some of the worst abuses in the U.S. system.  
There are examples of what such a law might look like. In striking down the 
Ohio law, the Sixth Circuit provided a detailed critique of why the Ohio statute 
was overly broad, and what a more narrowly tailored statute would look like.357 
Election law scholar Richard Hasen has argued that a statute regulating only 
intentionally false statements involving easily verifiable factual statements 
(such as intentionally misstating the date of the election) could be sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest in protecting the right to 
vote.358 Targeting actual “fake news”—completely made up stories designed for 
commercial rather than political purposes—is another possible approach, as is 
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limiting a false statement law to micro-targeted online advertising not seen 
beyond its target audience and therefore less amenable to more narrowly tailored 
counter-speech remedies.359 Designing and enacting any such rule would be 
challenging, but nothing in current U.S. law takes it completely off the 
constitutional table.  
2. Content Exclusions in the United Kingdom  
Content-based exclusions do not face the same judicial scrutiny in the 
United Kingdom as in the United States, but even in the United Kingdom such 
laws do face some judicial skepticism. Courts in the United Kingdom have 
imposed reasonableness and proportionality restraints on speech regulations 
enforcing primary legislation, and Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights creates a judicially protected freedom of expression right 
applicable in the United Kingdom through the Human Rights Act 1998.360 More 
generally, U.K. courts, like their U.S. counterparts, recognize the special 
importance in a democracy of free and robust discussion of political issues, and 
are sensitive to that when evaluating content-based regulations of political 
speech.361 
Nonetheless, it is plainly true that U.K. lawmakers have more leeway to 
regulate false or misleading campaign speech than do their U.S. counterparts. 
The RPA prohibits the use of fraud or “undue influence” in political campaigns, 
and U.K. courts have permitted prosecution under those provisions for things 
like distributing an election flyer falsely claiming to have been created by a rival 
party, and making false statements that a candidate has withdrawn from an 
election.362 But the most extensive judicial treatment of content-based 
restrictions on political speech in the United Kingdom has come under 
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Section 106 of the RPA.363 Section 106 prohibits any person from attempting to 
influence an election by making or publishing “false statement[s] of fact” in 
relation to a candidate’s “personal” character.364 Candidates who violate this 
provision are subject to civil fines and can be barred from standing for elective 
office.365 Courts also have the authority to set aside elections tainted by 
violations of the statute.366  
Prosecutions under Section 106 have been few, but they have been sustained 
by U.K. courts.367 The decision in Watkins v. Woolas is illustrative.368 In 
Woolas, the Parliamentary Election Court considered whether to set aside an 
election result on the grounds that the winning candidate violated 
Section 106.369 The underlying allegation involved three statements made by the 
winning candidate (Woolas) about his opponent (Watkins): that Watkins had 
failed to condemn the actions of violent Muslim extremists, had actively 
solicited the support of such extremists, and had reneged on a promise to live in 
the constituency district in which he was standing.370 
The court determined that all three statements, in context, were intentionally 
false statements of fact.371 It further found that Woolas had no reasonable 
grounds for believing they were true and that he did not in fact believe them to 
be so.372 The court then found the first two statements were made with 
intentional dishonesty.373 Finally, the court held that the first two statements 
were about Watkins’s personal character (which are covered by Section 106), 
rather than his political behavior or opinions (which are not).374 The court 
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therefore determined that the first two statements had violated Section 106 and 
that the election should be set aside.375 
Woolas appealed, arguing that applying Section 106 to his statements 
violated the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.376 The U.K. appellate court disagreed.377 Citing 
an earlier case (Bowman v. United Kingdom378), the court agreed with Woolas 
that free elections and freedom of expression are the “bedrock” of democracy, 
and that Article 10 required judges to carefully review laws restricting a 
candidate’s speech during an election period.379 But, the court went on, free and 
fair elections also require protecting the right of the electorate to make its 
choices based on the candidates’ competing positions and policy arguments, not 
on false statements about a candidate’s personal character.380 Section 106, with 
its limited focus on exactly that, was therefore a proportionate limitation on the 
freedom of expression protected by Article 10.381 
The U.K. courts’ more permissive approach to content-based regulations of 
political speech has been tested elsewhere as well. R (ProLife Alliance) v. 
British Broadcasting Corporation involved the BBC’s refusal to show a 
broadcast submitted by the Pro Life Alliance, a U.K. political party.382 As a 
political party registered under PPERA, the ProLife Alliance was entitled to 
make a broadcast on the BBC during the election period.383 But the ad it 
submitted included what the court described as “prolonged and graphic images 
of . . . mangled and mutilated” aborted fetuses.384 The BBC refused to broadcast 
the ad, citing its statutory power and duty to maintain standards of taste, 
decency, and non-offensiveness in its programing.385  
The ProLife Alliance sued, arguing that the BBC’s refusal to broadcast the 
ad because of its content violated Article 10.386 The case reached the U.K. 
Supreme Court, which upheld the BBC’s decision.387 Lord Nicholls’ lead 
opinion acknowledged that Article 10 required that the content-based 
restrictions imposed by the BBC be justified, particularly when used to censor 
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the broadcast of a political party during an election campaign.388 But, Lord 
Nicholls went on, nothing in U.K. law or Article 10 jurisprudence entitled 
political parties to an exemption from a generally applicable prohibition on the 
broadcast of offensive material.389 A concurring opinion by Lord Hoffman 
elaborated on this point, noting that the primary right protected by Article 10 in 
the context of a generally applicable prohibition is a right to not be denied access 
to the airways on “discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable” grounds.390 
Because the BBC’s decision was based in preexisting and non-discriminatory 
standards, it was lawful under the ECHR’s Article 10 jurisprudence.391  
The upshot of these cases is that while U.K. courts, like their U.S. 
counterparts, recognize the importance in a democracy of robust discussion of 
political issues, and consequently engage in more searching review of content-
based restrictions involving political speech,392 they also are more accepting of 
restrictions designed to protect democratic discourse from false, misleading, or 
offensive campaigning.  
Reform proposals in the United Kingdom calling for content-based 
prohibitions on false or harmful election communications draw on this leniency. 
Many of these proposals came together in an April 2019 report, the “Online 
Harms White Paper,” presented to Parliament by the Home Department working 
in conjunction with the Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee.393 The 
report identifies four kinds of online harms: online harassment and bullying, 
terroristic propaganda and recruitment, political disinformation, and gang and 
criminal glorification.394 The core proposal in the report is that Parliament 
should impose a statutory duty of care on large social media and digital data 
companies requiring them to adopt risk-based and proportionate policies 
addressing the most egregious online harms immediately, while gradually 
developing better practices in regard to lesser harms.395 The law would not 
require companies to engage in any particular specified acts.396 Instead, the legal 
obligation imposed would require companies to create, follow, and enforce 
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practices sufficient to meet the statutory duty of care.397 An independent 
regulator would oversee compliance, generate public reports regarding company 
practices, and impose fines and liability on non-compliant companies.398 
Despite its rather ambitious scope, many of the recommendations in the 
report are relatively benign.399 In several areas, the report’s most important 
contribution is to highlight existing regulatory gaps allowing activity to go 
unpunished online even when it would be regulated or prohibited under current 
law if occurring offline.400 For example, as discussed above, the RPA already 
prohibits fraud and undue influence in elections, and penalizes candidates for 
making false statements of fact about the character of their opponents.401 
Campaign statements in the United Kingdom also are subject to criminal and 
civil laws restricting copyright, libel, contempt and obscenity, and similar 
existing prohibitions against the incitement of racial or religious hatred.402 Yet 
as the “Online Harms” report highlights, these generally applicable rules are 
rarely enforced online. Several of the suggestions in the report aim merely to 
close that gap.  
In regard to digital disinformation, the report goes further and suggests that 
the rapid spread of online disinformation designed to mislead voters or 
undermine democratic processes may call for new regulatory controls.403 It 
grounds this observation in the “unprecedented effectiveness” of online actors 
to use false information online to manipulate public opinion through 
automation, anonymity, and fraud.404 Even here, though, the report notes that a 
precedent already exists in British law for regulating covert efforts to manipulate 
public opinion, and proposes that those same principles guide any new approach 
to online regulation.405  
The “Online Harms” report concludes by making several relatively modest 
recommendations about how social media companies could meet any statutory 
duty of care imposed by future legislation.406 It suggests they adopt terms of 
service prohibiting users from misrepresenting their identity on social media for 
the purpose of disseminating or amplifying disinformation, use automated AI 
techniques to find and remove fake news items, develop systems to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of content providers, make more reliable content more visible 
to users, and require users to be notified when they are interacting with 
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automated accounts or looking at paid content.407 None of these suggestions are 
legally extraordinary, and all deserve at least some comparative consideration.  
3. Content Exclusions Recap 
The law regulating content-based exclusions is meaningfully different in the 
United States and United Kingdom, and these differences are highly relevant to 
the reform proposals under consideration in each country. Regulators in the 
United Kingdom have much more flexibility than their U.S. counterparts in 
devising content-based strategies to deal with online electioneering and foreign 
interference. But this does not mean that there is no value in comparative study, 
even here. Courts in the United States have done a great deal of thinking about 
the value and risks of content-based regulation of political speech, and U.K. 
regulators would surely benefit from careful consideration of this jurisprudence. 
The U.S. experience here is extensive, and valuable even to those who disagree 
with the ultimate conclusions reached.  
At least some recommendations in the “Online Harms” report also should 
have value to U.S. reformers, especially those that resonate within U.S. 
consumer protection, fraud, and defamation law. Paying attention to how these 
suggestions are operationalized in the United Kingdom may stimulate new 
thinking about how they could be implemented within existing U.S. law. Even 
recommendations unlikely to be constitutional in the United States if imposed 
on social media companies by law may nonetheless provide case studies for 
social media companies looking for ways to better manage their online space. 
Facebook, for example, already is experimenting with providing information 
about the reliability of content providers,408 and Twitter has taken some steps 
toward eliminating imposter accounts and bot-nets.409 Thus, while the legal 
environment around content-based regulations is very different in the United 
States and United Kingdom, the two countries nonetheless have things to learn 
from each even here. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 2016 elections in the United States and United Kingdom revealed how 
challenging it is in both nations to effectively regulate online and foreign 
election interference under current law. Despite the urgent need to remedy this, 
widespread assumptions about America’s “First Amendment Exceptionalism” 
                                                                                                                     
 407 Id.  
 408 Jessica Guynn, Facebook Is Judging How Trustworthy You Are: What You Need to 
Know, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news /2018/ 
08/21/facebook-trust-reputation-score/1052839002/ [https://perma.cc/SK2T-XFBE]. 
 409 Alyssa Newcomb, Twitter Is Purging Millions of Fake Accounts—and Investors Are 
Spooked, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/twitter-
purging-millions-fake-accounts-investors-are-spooked-n889941 [https://perma.cc/R3ZC-
WGUY]. 
2020] FIRST AMENDMENT (UN)EXCEPTIONALISM 463 
have left regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates in both countries 
relatively uninterested in each other’s efforts. This Article hopes to change that. 
Evaluating the reform proposals being considered in each nation through a 
common taxonomy enables us to see more clearly where differences between 
the legal systems of the two nations do and do not pose system-specific 
challenges to different types of reform proposals, and to direct future 
comparative efforts accordingly.  
As the above analysis shows, there are several areas where further 
comparative study would be valuable. In regard to public education, few legal 
barriers hinder reforms in either country, and advocates in the United States and 
United Kingdom should freely share and learn from each other’s efforts. In 
regard to increased transparency, the United States can learn from the United 
Kingdom’s experience with lower disclosure thresholds for individual donors 
and its wider experience with pay-to-produce rather than pay-to-place 
thresholds for transparency rules. The United States also could benefit from 
Scotland’s experience in actually implementing a comprehensive online imprint 
requirement. The United Kingdom, in turn, can learn from the decades of 
experience the United States has in trying to fairly and effectively distinguish 
regulated campaigning from unregulated political speech. The United Kingdom 
also may benefit from studying the successes and failures of the more detailed 
and ongoing reporting requirements common in the U.S. system. 
Similar opportunities for constructive comparison exist in regard to foreign 
source and content exclusions. Both nations are struggling with the definition of 
“foreign” when defining a political community. There will be much to be 
learned here as each country continues exploring the parameters of and 
justifications for their respective foreign source bans. The United States also 
could learn from the United Kingdom’s longer history of regulating corporate 
campaign spending, including the spending of domestic subsidiaries of foreign-
held entities. Even in regard to content exclusions, where the basic law of the 
two nations is the most different, there are areas where comparative study would 
be valuable. Courts in the United Kingdom have done quite a bit of thinking 
about how false statements of verifiable facts interfere with the right of voters 
to make informed decisions based on accurate information. The United States 
could learn from this when considering whether and how to craft narrow laws 
penalizing egregious misrepresentation and fraud in the electoral realm. The 
United Kingdom, in turn, may benefit from the extensive judicial and scholarly 
literature in the United States documenting the risks of being too eager to adopt 
broad prohibitions in this area.  
The United States and the United Kingdom share a long tradition of 
insightful comparative scholarship. While there are real and meaningful 
differences between the legal regulation of campaign communications in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, those differences present few barriers to 
many of the most significant types of reform proposals being considered in each 
country, so that tradition can and should continue through additional 
comparative work in this critical area. 
